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1. INTRODUCTION
The People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) has received
considerable criticism from the United States for the human rights
issues raised by its Internet surveillance program. For example,
according to a 2012 Congressional Research Service (“CRS”) Report
for Congress, Freedom House ranked the People’s Republic of
China as “one of the five countries with the lowest levels of Internet
and ‘new media’ freedom.”1 Some Western commentators echo this
same type of criticism of the PRC’s Internet surveillance program.2
At first glance, such criticism seems overwhelmingly justified, if not
for any other reason that approximately seventy PRC citizens have
been incarcerated for writing about politically sensitive topics online
in the past few years,3 which has raised serious concerns over the
freedom of speech there. It is difficult to assess the validity of this
criticism of the PRC’s Internet surveillance laws and policies
without clearly designating a referent.
Using U.S. Internet
surveillance laws and policies as the referent, PRC Internet
surveillance laws and policies arguably can be seen as more in line
with international human rights norms, especially with regard to
predictability, although that might be changing on account of the
recent Snowden revelations. While the Snowden revelations
undoubtedly have had catastrophic effects on national security, they
potentially have helped improve the human rights situation in the
1 See THOMAS LUM ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42601, CHINA, INTERNET
FREEDOM, AND U.S. POLICY 1 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
R42601.pdf (providing a policy overview of Internet freedom in China).
2 See, e.g., Richard Klein, An Analysis of China’s Human Rights Policies in Tibet:
China’s Compliance with the Mandates of International Law Regarding Civil and Political
Rights, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 115, 149–64 (2011) (describing how “the Chinese
government’s continuing regulation of the Internet . . . violates international standards of free expression”).
3 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2011 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: CHINA 10 (May 2012)
(“NGOs estimated that since late February approximately 50 human rights activists
and lawyers were formally arrested or placed under extralegal detention, up to 200
people were placed under house arrest, and 15 were charged with ‘inciting subversion of state power.’”); FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011: A GLOBAL
ASSESSMENT AND INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA 105 (2011), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/freedom-net-2011 (featuring a country report on the penalties enforced in the PRC against freedom of expression).
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United States by disabusing U.S. citizens of the notion that the U.S.
Constitution actually protects them from unreasonable Internet
searches and seizures by the government.
In presenting and defending this argument, this article is
divided into five parts, including this brief introduction and an
equally brief conclusion in Parts 1 and 5, respectively. Part 2 sets
out the obligations under international law concerning Internet
surveillance, which is helpful in assessing the U.S. and PRC
approaches to Internet surveillance. Part 3 explores the U.S. laws
governing Internet surveillance — especially the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) and the USA Patriot Act. Part
4 analyzes the PRC laws governing Internet surveillance. While
there are numerous articles that analyze the PRC approach to
Internet surveillance, it would appear that none of them provide the
actual language of the PRC laws that directly relate to Internet
surveillance,4 let alone analyze the actual PRC laws, as this article
does. Moreover, this article appears to be the first to mention the
predictability issues associated with Internet surveillance laws.
These two features of this article in and of themselves make this a
valuable contribution to the literature, with the other features —
including the comparative elements of this analysis5 — only adding
4 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Privacy Laws and Privacy Levers: Online Surveillance Versus Economic Development in the People’s Republic of China, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 853–
862 (2013) (quoting only the PRC Constitution and the General Civil Code, and otherwise referring to secondary sources for language and support); Omar Saleem,
China’s Internet Policies within the Global Community, 17 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 299 (2012)
(quoting the PRC Constitution without reference to the language of PRC laws); JyhAn Lee & Ching-Yi Liu, Forbidden City Enclosed by the Great Firewall: The Law and
Power of Internet Filtering in China, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 125 (2012) (arguing that
the Internet in China is regulated by code rather than law); Jyh-An Lee, Regulating
Blogging and Microblogging in China, 91 OR. L. REV. 301, 311 (2012) (detailing how
more than “sixty government regulations, enforced at both the national and local
levels, regulate online content). Please note that only the Chinese version of PRC
laws (except the Hong Kong Basic Law and the Macao Basic Law) are authentic and
have legal effect. See, e.g., John Bahrij & Lily Ko, An Overview of English Resources
for Chinese Legal Research, 13 LEGAL INFO. MGMT 25 (2013) ; Wei Luo, How to Find the
Law of the People's Republic of China: A Research Guide and Selective Annotated Bibliography, 88 LAW LIBR. J. 402, 408 (1996) (stating that the primary source of law in the
People’s Republic of China is statutes). The English translations provided in this
article have come from Westlaw China, which arguably provides the most accurate
translations of the PRC documents being reviewed in this article.
5 It is important to note that a thorough and direct comparison of the two laws
is difficult inasmuch as the context and purposes of the U.S. and PRC Internet surveillance laws are so dramatically different. For example, U.S. laws on Internet surveillance clearly are guided and limited by the U.S. Constitution and important judicial cases, and so the basic goals and substantial purposes of those laws are to
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to this article’s overwhelming value. Again, this article’s thesis is
that the PRC’s Internet surveillance laws, while not ideal, are better
than the U.S. laws with regard to predictability inasmuch as there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in the PRC. Admittedly, the
United States might be catching up in the sense that U.S. citizens
might not have a reasonable expectation of privacy anymore after
the Snowden revelations, notwithstanding the Fourth Amendment.
To be clear, this certainly is not something to be proud of in either
jurisdiction.
The main tension for both the United States and the PRC lies in
the individuals’ right to privacy and the public benefit of the
government being able to detect and respond to threats to national
security. Such tension between privacy and national security when
it comes to Internet surveillance has been well documented in other
studies, and the purpose of this article is not to rehash that debate.6
Nor is this article’s purpose to document the efforts of the People’s
Republic of China to interfere with Internet usage through
surveillance, which has been provided in other studies.7 Rather, this
article analyzes and evaluates U.S. and PRC laws in relation to
Internet surveillance with the aim of assessing whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in either jurisdiction and whether the
laws impact predictability. Both jurisdictions are similar in that they
both may have elements that are not entirely in compliance with
international obligations, mainly with regard to proportionality and
necessity of the measures, among other issues. Moreover, both use
“delegated control” over Internet service providers (“ISPs”) to
control the Internet. The main difference is that U.S. law gives the
appearance that government Internet surveillance is restricted by
law, whereas PRC law does not create such an appearance. On the
protect civil rights and limit the power of executive agencies. The independent judicial branch of the United States also clarifies and refines the substantive meaning
of those rules. However, in the People’s Republic of China, the legislative and judicial branches are controlled by the executive branch and the Communist Party of
China. All the PRC laws, regulations and guidelines are merely tools to maintain
economic development, social stability and the Party's ruling position. Some of
those PRC rules about Internet surveillance are formulated in a general and ambiguous way in order to pretend to protect civil rights, while the top Party leaders and
vested interest groups remain opposed to the actual implementation of those rules.
To make matters worse, the dependent judicial branch cannot effectively prevent or
mitigate this situation.
6 See, e.g., A. Wayne MacKay, Human Rights in the Global Village: The Challenges
of Privacy and National Security, 20 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 6 (2006) (describing National
Security and privacy measures in the context of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism).
7 See generally Lee & Liu, supra note 4, at 125; Lee, supra note 4, at 609.
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contrary, it is common knowledge and is even reflected in the law
that the PRC government has the power and discretion to conduct
Internet surveillance at will. 8 In a way, the PRC approach seems
more transparent and even honest, which certainly is not to condone
the PRC’s policies or the punishment that might flow from the
implementation of these policies. Admittedly, U.S. citizens and
people throughout the world have become more cognizant of the
lack of privacy on the Internet in the wake of the Snowden NSA
surveillance leaks, which might not have otherwise happened under
the (mistaken) belief the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution actually protects privacy from such surveillance.9 In
the end, this article asserts that the PRC Internet surveillance
policies, at least prior to sentencing,10 are more compliant with
human rights norms than U.S. policies, at least with regard the
element of predictability. As the old proverb goes: Better the Devil
you know than the Devil you don’t.
2. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNET SURVEILLANCE
The Edward Snowden saga has thrust U.S. Internet
surveillance and its associated privacy and freedom-of-speech
issues onto center stage, along with many other issues.11 On June 5,

See generally Bartow, supra note 4, at 853–62.
For instance, when a freedom of expression advocacy group surveyed over
520 American writers, 28 percent have curtailed their social media activities and 24
percent of those respondents have avoided discussing certain topics on the telephone. See THE FDR GROUP, PEN AMERICA, CHILLING EFFECTS: NSA SURVEILLANCE
DRIVES U.S. WRITERS TO SELF-CENSOR (2013), available at http://www.pen.org/
chilling-effects (showing that the American public is less informed than writers are
in regard to the degree of internet surveillance in the United States). See generally
Jed Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101 (2008).
10 With regard to the pre-sentencing delimitation of this article, critics will argue that the inability to know whether you are on the PRC’s blacklist, at least until
you are stopped at the border or somewhere else, should be factored into the predictability calculation when comparing the policies of the United States and the
People’s Republic of China. However, the same can be said about decisions of the
U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and intelligence agencies to engage in
surveillance, with the target only learning of such surveillance at the point of arrest,
and so it arguably is a wash.
11 For example, revelations came to light in 2002 that the National Security
Agency (“NSA”) had been spying on German Chancellor Angela Merkel and 34
other world leaders. See James Ball, NSA Monitored Calls of 35 World Leaders after US
Official Handed over Contacts, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2013, http://www.
8
9
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2013, the Guardian began to publish a series of articles that disclosed
highly classified aspects of the electronic surveillance operations of
the National Security Agency (“NSA”) and provided classified
documents to support such allegations.12 These NSA operations
include access to “vast databases containing e-mails, online chats,
and the browsing histories of millions of individuals”13 and Internet
traffic of U.S. citizens.14 The NSA Internet surveillance program also
involves the targeting of foreign persons “reasonably believed to be
outside the United States” using broad-based Internet surveillance
to obtain information from the servers of Microsoft, Yahoo, Google,

theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls (reporting on Snowden’s document claiming surveillance of the phone conversations
of world leaders by the National Security Agency). According to Snowden, the NSA
monitored Chancellor Merkel’s mobile phone for 11 years, including the numbers
called, duration and location (metadata) and the contents of her calls and text messages. See Derek Scally, Dial M for Merkel: Angela’s Next Move, IRISH TIMES, Nov. 2,
2013, at 1 (reporting that Merkel’s phone was monitored for 11 years by the National
Security Agency and what the implications for Germany were). U.S. and U.K. relations also have been strained due in part to Snowden’s revelations about a joint
U.S.-British spying operation on the Internet. See Paul Richter & Ken Dilanian, US
Spying Scandal Straining Ties with Europe, DAILY WORLD, Nov. 1, 2013, available at
http://www.articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/30/world/la-fg-nsa-diplo-fallout20131031 (reporting on strained U.S.-U.K. relations in the aftermath of the Snowden
reports). Snowden also provided leaks indicating that U.S. intelligence officials had
hacked into the e-mail accounts of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto and Felipe Calderon. See Mexican Diplomats Say Obama Promises Investigation into NSA Spying, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 2013, at 1, http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/oct/22/mexico-president-nsa-spying-email (reporting on Snowden indicating that the email accounts of Mexican Presidents had been hacked). Snowden also
disclosed that U.S. intelligence spied on Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff and
other South American leaders. See Jonathan Watts, Brazilian President Postpones
Washington Visit Over NSA Spying, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/17/brazil-president-snub-us-nsa (reporting
that Brazilian and other South American leaders were implicated by the National
Security Agency’s surveillance).
12 See Jeffrey T. Richelson, Take It To The Limit: Smith v. Maryland and NSA’s
Phone Metadata Collection Program, NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVES (Sept. 4, 2013),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB436/ (providing official detail of
the phone monitoring by the National Security Agency).
13 See Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User
does on the Internet,’ THE GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
(describing
XKeyscore, which allows National Security Agency analysts to go through the internet history of millions of individuals).
14 See Richelson, supra note 12, at 3 (describing “electronic surveillance operations involving not only extensive collection of foreign communications, including
Internet traffic, but the collection of the metadata associated with phone calls [foreign and domestic] made by United States citizens.”)
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Facebook and other companies.15
This program gives the
government access to search histories, e-mail content, file transfers,
and live chat.16 The source of this information was revealed to be
Edward J. Snowden — former CIA agent and NSA-contractor with
Booz Allen Hamilton.17 On June 14, the U.S. government filed a
sealed criminal complaint against Snowden.18 Snowden was in
Hong Kong at the time and reportedly spent his final two days in
Hong Kong at the Russian Consulate.19 He received a SAFEPASS
issued by the Ecuadorian embassy in London and traveled to
Moscow while seeking asylum elsewhere.20 At the time, the U.S.
government sought to discourage states from offering asylum to
Snowden and went so far as to seek extradition.21 The story has
continued to unfold over time, as more leaked information has been
revealed and the United States continues to try to gain custody of
Snowden. These incidents have raised questions over the adequacy
of contemporary IT law, which seems more focused on the
obligations of data users to protect personal data than the
obligations of states not to surreptitiously gather and use such data,
whether for national security reasons or for other reasons. While
drafters of IT law scramble to create new regulations that directly
and adequately address these new types of situations, international
law provides a number of stopgaps that are designed to limit state
behavior in this area, one of which is the right to privacy under
international human rights law. This part explores the contours of
this stopgap.

15 See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About PRISM to Date, THE
WASH. POST WONKBLOG, June 12, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date/
(describing the PRISM system which the National Security Agency uses “to gain
access to the private communications of users of nine popular internet services”
and the reaction of Internet companies).
16 See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps into User
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data (reporting on the
previously undisclosed PRISM system and including the reaction of representatives
from Google and Apple).
17 See Richelson, supra note 12, at 3 (discussing how The Guardian revealed
Snowden was the source of the leaked NSA information).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 3-4.
21 Id. at 4.
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The Internet always has posed interesting issues for
international law.22 In particular, numerous commentators see the
Internet as having undermined traditional notions of state
sovereignty by diminishing the role of territorial boundaries.23 Of
course, the Internet has not been entirely bad for international law,
instead improving the efficiency of treaty negotiations, adjudication,
and enforcement.24 However, the crosscutting issues that the
Internet has raised have proven to be quite troublesome, especially
with the limitless data storage and efficient search capabilities that
exist or appear to exist.25 This part emphasizes the important role
that the Internet has played with government regulation, state
power, and civil society.26 In particular, Internet surveillance of
domestic citizens and foreigners, whether through selective
targeting or done on a mass scale, can have a significant chilling
22 See generally Molly Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 394 (2013).
23 See Henry H. Perritt, Cyberspace and State Sovereignty, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD.
155, 156–71 (1997) (investigating how information technology is shaping the new
world order); ULRICH BECK, POWER IN THE GLOBAL AGE: A NEW GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY xi (Kathleen Cross trans., Polity Press 2005) (2002) (exploring how national and international boundaries are dissolving in light of modernity); AnneMarie Slaughter and William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. J INT'L L. 327, 327–52 (2006) (“The traditional Westphalia sovereignty state system with ‘defined physical territories’ of
states, exclusive and isolated, can no longer be appropriate in the era of globalization.”). See also Henry H. Perritt, Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy
or Rediscovered Royalism?, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 437–38 (1997) (exploring the
idea of self-governance of cyberspace); Am. Library Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that typically “jurisdictional limits are related to
geography; geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet”). See generally Peter Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice
of Law and the Internet, 32 INT’L LAW. 991 (1998); Laura Ann Forbes, More Convenient
Crime: Why States Must Regulate Internet-Related Criminal Activity under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 20 PACE L. REV. 189 (1999). But see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU,
WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (discussing
governmental control of the Internet).
24 See Henry H. Perritt, The Internet is Changing International Law, 73 Chi-Kent
L. Rev. 997, 1000 (1997) (explaining how Non-Governmental Organizations
(“NGOs”) are shaping international law with the help of media attention through
the internet).
25 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 32–33 (Jack M. Balkin and Beth Simone Noveck eds., New York
University Press 2004) (coining internet surveillance as “dataveillance,” as surveillance is performed by collecting facts and data).
26 See INTERNET AND SURVEILLANCE: THE CHALLENGES OF WEB 2.0 AND SOCIAL
MEDIA 10 (Christian Fuchs et al. eds., 2013) (2011) (discussing the political implications of internet surveillance, citing the USA Patriot Act as an example of a reaction
to internet surveillance capabilities).
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effect on expression and undermine the privacy rights that the
international human rights regime was designed to protect.27
Traditional state-centered responses seem inadequate in facing
these types of challenges,28 and so it would appear that greater
innovation with regard to international governance and
surveillance institutions is needed. Regardless, this part describes
international law as it currently exists in relation to these two areas.
2.1. The Legal Significance of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and U.N. Special Rapporteur Reports
Before analyzing the actual ICCPR provisions and secondary
sources of law with regard to the rights to privacy and freedom of
expression, it is important to explain the legal significance of the
writings of U.N. Special Rapporteurs, inasmuch as the analysis in
the next section relies on such writings, and states might claim that
those reports do not bind them when it comes to interference in
privacy rights. This section also addresses the argument that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not apply
to the People’s Republic of China because it is not a state party to
the covenant.
27 The right to privacy in this digital age, especially the Internet, is crucial to
the “promotion and protection of human rights.” U.N. General Assembly, The
Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
on 18 December 2013 [on the report of the Third Committee (A/68/456/Add.2)],
A/RES/68/167; Progress Report on the European Electronic Communications
Market 2009 (15th report), Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, COM (2010) 253 final/3, Aug. 25, 2010, at 15. See also
Jonathon W. Penney, Internet Access Rights: A Brief History and Intellectual Origins,
38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 10 (2011) (explaining how the internet holds potential for
great political progress, but also for censorship and surveillance); U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends and Challenges to
the Right of All Individuals to Seek, Receive and Impart Information and Ideas of
All Kinds Through the Internet, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/27, May 16, 2011, at 14, ¶¶
49–50 (reporting on the applicability of human rights norms and standards to the
usage of the internet for communication and expression); JAMES MICHAEL &
GEORGES B. KUTUKDJIAN, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY ch. 3 (1994) (providing information on “countries with national data
protection laws and access to government information”).
28 See MILTON MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 1 (2010) (discussing pressure between governments, state
sovereignty, and the non-territorial space of the internet).
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Starting with the legal significance of the writings of U.N.
Special Rapporteurs, two cases of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) are relevant by analogy. In the 1969 North Sea Continental
Shelf Cases, the ICJ asked whether a lex ferenda rule formulated by the
International Law Commission could become binding international
law by virtue of codification.29 The issue was whether Germany was
bound by the equidistance rule under Article 6 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, considering that Germany had
not signed this Convention.30 Denmark and the Netherlands
acknowledged that Article 6 was not declaratory of an existing
customary rule because “prior to the Conference, continental shelf
law was only in the formative stage, and State practice lacked
uniformity.”31 However, they argued that there already was an
emerging customary law that was crystallized in Article 6,32 and
“the process of the definition and consolidation of the emerging
customary law took place through the work of the International Law
Commission, the reaction of governments to that work and the
proceedings of the Geneva Conference.”33 The International Court
of Justice rejected the argument of Denmark and the Netherlands
that the equidistance rule under Article 6 was an emerging
customary law that was defined and consolidated through the work
of the International Law Commission.34 Upon review of the process
undertaken by the International Law Commission leading up to the
adoption of the equidistance rule, the International Court of Justice
concluded that the rule “was proposed by the Commission with
considerable hesitation, somewhat on an experimental basis, at most
de lege ferenda, and not at all de lege lata or as an emerging rule of
customary international law.”35 Based on the ruling in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, it can be stated that, when it comes to a lex
29 See North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.) 1969
I.C.J. REP. 3, 38 (Feb. 20, 1969) (stating Germany’s argument that a lex ferenda rule
could be formulated by way of existing customary international law).
30 See id. at 23 (stating that the equidistance rule under Article 6 was the most
convenient but that in itself is not reason for the rule to be chosen as a force of law).
31 Id. at 38.
32 See id. (arguing that the practice of delimitation was a part of customary
law).
33 Id.
34 See id. (concluding that Germany did not act in a way to incur the obligations
of Article 6 of the Geneva Convention or customary law).
35 Id. See also Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 627 701–02 (2001) (discussing the concept of “emerging” customary
international law).
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ferenda principle formulated by the International Law Commission
(and by extension a U.N. Special Rapporteur), codification by the
International Law Commission is not sufficient to give rise to a
binding rule of law.36 By extension, if the International Law
Commission provides its formulation of law without hesitation and
not on an experimental basis, then it might have sufficient weight to
be considered binding, or at least to be closer to the binding side of
the binding/non-binding dichotomy when one considers these
norms on a sliding scale of legal weight.37
In the 2010 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo ICJ judgment concerning the
case between the Republic of Guinea and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, one of the main questions was whether the Democratic
Republic of the Congo had violated Diallo’s individual rights under
international law when it arrested, detained and expelled him in
1995–1996.38 Diallo was a Guinean businessman residing in Zaire
who had been seeking repayment of debts that oil-related
companies there had owed his businesses when the detention and
expulsion occurred.39 Guinea brought the claim in the form of
diplomatic protection of its citizen for a “serious violation of
international law” by the Democratic Republic of the Congo for its
mistreatment of Diallo.40
Concerning the 1995–1996 arrest,
detention, and expulsion of Diallo, the International Court of Justice
referred to Article 13 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which provides:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the
present Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and
shall, except where compelling reasons of national security
otherwise require, be allowed to submit the reasons against
his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be
represented for the purpose before, the competent authority

36 See HUGH THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION 16–
21 (1972) (discussing how codified laws enter the international legal realm).
37 See generally Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?,
77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413 (1983) (describing the international legal order as being made
up of norms of varying weight).
38 See generally Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of Congo) 2010 ICJ REP. 639, 659–73 (Nov. 30).
39 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Preliminary Objections, 2007 ICJ REP. 582, 586 (May 24).
40 Id. at 585–86.
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or a person or persons especially designated by the
competent authority.41
The International Court of Justice determined that an alien who was
lawfully in the territory of a state could only be expelled if the
decision was taken in accordance with law, the law itself was
compliant with international law, and the expulsion was not
arbitrary in nature.42 The International Court of Justice confirmed
that this approach was supported by the jurisprudence of the
Human Rights Committee, including its General Comments.43 The
International Court of Justice then explained the legal significance
of such General Comments:
Although the Court is in no way obliged, in the exercise of
its judicial functions, to model its own interpretation of the
Covenant on that of the Committee, it believes that it should
ascribe great weight to the interpretation adopted by this
independent body that was established specifically to
supervise the application of that treaty. The point here is to
achieve the necessary clarity and the essential consistency of
international law, as well as legal security, to which both the
individuals with guaranteed rights and the States obliged to
comply with treaty obligations are entitled.44
In other words, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee
have “great weight” when used to interpret the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which means at a minimum
that they need to be taken into consideration in good faith when
interpreting the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. At most, they have some binding weight on state parties to
the Covenant. The fact that these types of instruments have
significant legal weight is supported by a number of reliable
secondary sources.45 Of course, the Human Rights Committee sees
41 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Judgment, 2010 ICJ REP. 639, 663 (Nov. 30).
42 Id.
43 See id. at 663–64 (confirming the Human Rights Committee’s support via the
Covenant to ensure compliance).
44 Id. at 664.
45 See Int’l Law Ass’n Berlin Conference, Sept. 26–27, 2003, Final Report on the
Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 27, 43 (2004) (referring to the General Comments of the Human Rights Committee as “authoritative,” of “considerable importance” and of “considerable weight”). See generally
Helen Keller & Leena Grover, General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and
their Legitimacy, in UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES: LAW AND LEGITIMACY 116,
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its General Comments as being an integral part of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inasmuch as they form part
of the supervisory machinery created by the Covenant,46 although
the Human Rights Committee might not be entirely without bias on
this issue. This article is not inclined to give the same amount of
legal weight to these General Comments as the Human Rights
Committee does, or else this type of interpretation quickly would
become a shortcut to outright amendment of the Covenant, which
could not have been intended by the member states when drafting
the amendment provision of the Covenant in Article 51. Still, when
one considers these norms on a sliding scale of legal weight, as
opposed to a binding/non-binding dichotomy, it is relatively easy
to see these norms as being much closer to the binding end of the
spectrum in light of the ICJ’s opinion of their legal significance. At
a minimum, the legal weight given to International Law
Commission pronouncements and interpretations by General
Comments of the Human Rights Committee are equivalent to the
reports of UN Special Rapporteurs inasmuch as they all constitute
secondary sources of international law from relatively authoritative
entities.
Hugh Thirlway provides an interesting systematic explanation
of the significance of these types of determinations by relatively
authoritative entities in international law. Thirlway identifies the
two main methods of codification as codification by states and
codification by scholars, such as the members of the International
Law Commission, members of the Human Rights Committee and
U.N. Special Rapporteurs, “acting as scholars and not as
representatives of any State or group of States.”47 The second
method is called codification juridique, and it involves the

116–98 (Helen Keller & Geir Ulfstein eds., 2012).
46 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Comment
No. 24 (52), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994), ¶ 7 (“The object
and purpose of the Covenant is to . . . provide an efficacious supervisory machinery
for the obligations undertaken.”). See also Int’l Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 40, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. A/6316
(1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976) (envisioning the Committee as gathering
reports from member States on the “measures they have adopted which give effect
to the rights recognized” in the Covenant, studying these reports, and transmitting
General Comments “as it may consider appropriate” and the reports to member
States, all of which is seen as representing part of the object and purpose of the
Covenant).
47 THIRLWAY, supra note 36, at 17.
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preparation of “unofficial codes of existing or desirable law,”48
which presumably also would include reports of U.N. Special
Rapporteurs. Under Article 15 of the Statute of the International
Law Commission, there are three stages of codification juridique: (1)
the systematic restatement of rules that already exist; (2) the more
precise formulation and systematization of rules that already exist
but are somehow insufficient; and (3) the codification of a new rule
or the substitution of an existing rule with a wholly new rule which
is “considered by the person or body responsible for the codification
as more satisfactory.”49 By analogy, it is the second stage of
codification juridique that could give the content of the U.N. Special
Rapporteur’s report considerable normative value for the United
States and the People’s Republic of China, even though it might not
be binding per se vis-à-vis both states. Regardless of whichever line
of reasoning one prefers, the U.S. and PRC laws relating to privacy
and Internet surveillance will be assessed against the norms found
within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the elaboration and
systematization of these rules contained in the U.N. Special
Rapporteur’s report.
When it comes to the appropriateness of assessing U.S. and PRC
laws in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, there appear to be no legal issues in relation to United States
laws inasmuch as the United States is a state party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the United
States has made no reservations that are relevant to privacy and
Internet surveillance.50 Critics quickly will point out that the
People’s Republic of China has no obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights because it is not
a state party to the Covenant.51 Admittedly, the People’s Republic
Id.
Id. at 17–19.
50 See U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Int’l Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: Status of Ratification, Reservations and Declarations
(Dec. 16, 1966), http://www.treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (listing the United States as one of
the signatories of the Covenant).
51 See, e.g., Vijay M. Padmanabhan, The Human Rights Justification for Consent,
35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 10 (2013) (stating that China is not a party to the ICCPR);
Katherine Tsai, How to Create International Law: The Case of Internet Freedom in China,
21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 401, 402 (2011) (stating that the ICCPR is not a binding
obligation upon China); Yutian Ling, Upholding Free Speech and Privacy Online: A
Legal-Based and Market-Based Approach for Internet Companies in China, 27 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 175, 188–89 (2011) (“China has signed but has
48
49
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of China is not a state party to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights inasmuch as it has not yet ratified the
Covenant,52 although it is a signatory to the Covenant from having
signed it on October 5, 1998.53 Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties indicates that signatories are “obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the]
treaty.”54 Therefore, the People’s Republic of China clearly has that
obligation. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear what constitutes the
“object and purpose” of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, although it is clear that the “object and purpose”
cannot be the entire treaty itself or else there would be no point to
the ratification process.55 It is difficult to see the provisions dealing
with the right to privacy and the freedom of expression as
constituting the “object and purpose” of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, which conceivably would be much
larger than those more specific rights.56 Be that as it may, the
People’s Republic of China still has binding obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights through its
consent to the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration, which applied the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to Hong Kong.57
The People’s Republic of China reiterated this consent when the
National People’s Congress adopted the Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China through a resolution on April 4, 1990, which states in Article
not ratified the ICCPR, which means it is not yet bound by the terms but should be
making an effort to ratify it.”).
52 But see Marton Sulyok, “In All Fairness . . .”: A Comparative Analysis of the Past,
Present and Future of Fair Trial Systems Outside of Europe, 27 IUS GENTIUM 101, 128–29
(2014) (mistakenly asserting that China has ratified the ICCPR).
53 U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, supra note 50.
54 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
55 See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 582–83 (6th ed,
2003) (describing the ratification process for such international covenants).
56 But see Ping Xiong, Freedom of Religion in China under the Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies, 2013 BYU L. REV. 605, 609 (2013) (asserting that
China’s ICCPR signature requires it to “respect, protect, and fulfil the freedom of
religion”).
57 See Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China
on the Question of Hong Kong, U.K.-China, art. 3, para. 3, Dec. 19, 1984 (“The laws
currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically unchanged.”); id. at annex I,
sec. XIII (“The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
. . . shall remain in force.”).
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39, “The provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights . . . shall remain in force and shall be implemented
through the laws of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region.”58 As Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties makes clear, it is consent that creates treaty obligations on
states,59 not necessarily full membership with a treaty regime.
Therefore, the People’s Republic of China’s consent to the
application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights in Hong Kong creates at least some binding obligations for
the People’s Republic of China, and so it is valid to assess the
People’s Republic of China’s actions in light of these obligations.
This removes the need to argue that the People’s Republic of China
has obligations similar to or equivalent to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights under customary
international law,60 or through Kelsen’s type of monism where all
international legal norms have weight for all states,61 although these
remain valid options for arguing that the People’s Republic of China
has obligations in this area. Of course, this is not to say that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights itself
necessarily applies throughout the whole of the People’s Republic
of China. Rather, the People’s Republic of China has some
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, and so must act in accordance with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights wherever it applies.
The question then becomes whether the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights applies only to Hong Kong law, as
opposed to all law that is applicable in Hong Kong, including PRC
XIANGGANG JIBEN FA art. 39 (H.K.) [hereinafter Basic Law].
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
60 See id. at art. 38 (noting how “rules in a treaty becoming binding on third
states through international custom); GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1st ed. 1983) (asserting that the ICCPR “embodies and crystallizes” customary international law); Ann Piccard, Women’s Rights are Human
Rights Redux: Ain’t I a Human?, 26 J. C. R. & ECON. DEV. 753, 762–71 (2012) (explaining how the ICCPR has become customary international law); Patrick Robinson,
The Interaction of Legal Systems in the Work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 16 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 17 (2009) (explaining that the fairtrial rights of the ICCPR are customary international law); Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV.
1535, 1542 (2009) (explaining that the anti-torture rights of the ICCPR mirror customary international law).
61 See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 333–34 (Max Knight trans., 1967)
(discussing legal, moral, and social norms for states).
58
59
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law. Basic Law Article 12 grants Hong Kong a “high degree of
autonomy,” which allows Hong Kong to have its own legislative
power, inter alia, in accordance with Article 17.62 However, this does
not mean that PRC law does not apply in Hong Kong and that the
applicable PRC law does not need to comply with the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Indeed, Article 18 of the
Basic Law provides, “National laws shall not be applied in the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex
III to this Law.”63 Annex III lists the following PRC laws, which
apply in Hong Kong:
 Resolution on the Capital, Calendar, National Anthem
and National Flag of the People's Republic of China;
 Resolution on the National Day of the People's Republic
of China;
 Order on the National Emblem of the People's Republic of
China Proclaimed by the Central People's Government
Attached: Design of the national emblem, notes of
explanation and instructions for use;
 Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of
China on the Territorial Sea;
 Nationality Law of the People's Republic of China; and
 Regulations of the People's Republic of China Concerning
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities.64
This list has been amended on at least three occasions, in 1997, 1998
and 2005,65 with Article 18 of the Basic Law providing the PRC
Standing Committee the ability to “add to or delete from the list of
laws in Annex III after consulting its Committee for the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the
government of the Region.”66 Therefore, at a minimum, the People’s
Republic of China must assess these laws, as well as any PRC laws
that might apply in Hong Kong in the context of a state of emergency
under Article 18 and any PRC laws used by the National People's
Congress when interpreting the Basic Law under its Articles 158 and
62
63
64
65
66

Basic Law, supra note 58, at art 12, 17.
Id. at art 18.
Id. at Annex III.
Id.
Id. at art 18.
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159, in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Basic Law Article 18(4) says that if the Standing Committee
of the National People’s Congress:
decides to declare a state of war or, by reason of turmoil
within the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region which
endangers national unity or security and is beyond the
control of the government of the Region, decides that the
Region is in a state of emergency, the Central People's
Government may issue an order applying the relevant
national laws in the Region.67
It is reasonably foreseeable that the Internet-surveillance-related
PRC laws discussed in Part 4 below presumably would be some of
the first laws to be applied in Hong Kong in the case of a state of war
or a state of emergency in the PRC’s effort to understand and control
the flow of information in Hong Kong.68
Id. at art 18(4).
Zhengfu Xinxi Gongkai Tiaoli (政府信息公开条例) [Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jan. 17, 2007,
effective May 1, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2007-04/24/content_
592937.htm (China). There remains the possibility that the Standing Committee already has declared a state of emergency in response to the recent Umbrella Movement, which would unlock the Central People’s Government’s powers to apply
PRC laws in Hong Kong, including those relating to Internet surveillance. However, Article 6 of the Emergency Response Law requires the creation of “an effective
social mobilization mechanism” in response to an emergency. ZHONGHUA RENMIN
GONGHEGUO TU FA SHIJIAN YINGDUI FA (中华人民共和国突发事件应对法) [Emergency Response Law of the People’s Republic of China], art. 6 (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007). This would remove the possibility of such a declaration of a state of emergency being kept secret, at least not
for very long. Moreover, Article 9 of the Regulation on the Disclosure of Government Information requires “administrative organs” such as the Central People’s
Government to “publish information involving the immediate interests of citizens,
legal persons or other organizations” and “a situation that requires the awareness
or participation of the public.” ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHENGFU XINXI
GONGKAI TIAOLI (中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例) [Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by St.
Council, Apr. 5, 2007). See Laney Zhang, China: New Implementing Regulations of Law
on
State
Secrets,
GLOBAL
LEGAL
MONITOR
(Mar.
31,
2014),
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-new-implementing-regulations-of-law-on-state-secrets/ (providing information on the Chinese government’s new measures and outlining its major provisions). Under Article 85 of the
PRC Constitution, the Central People’s Government is the “highest organ of State
administration.” XIANFA art. 85 (1982) (China). Therefore, it would appear that
PRC law would not allow the Standing Committee or the Central People’s Government to keep secret such a determination of a state of emergency and the application of PRC law in Hong Kong. It is, thus, relatively safe to assume that these Internet-surveillance-related PRC laws are not directly applicable in Hong Kong at this
67
68
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All of this is to say that it arguably is appropriate to assess both
U.S. and PRC Internet-surveillance-related laws in light of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
interpretations of the Covenant that have legal significance. The
remainder of this part elaborates on the exact provisions of the
Covenant that relate to the right to privacy and the freedom of
expression and some legally significant interpretations of those
rights, which then are used to assess the Internet-surveillancerelated laws of the United States and the People’s Republic of China
later in the article.
2.2. Privacy and the Freedom of Expression
Commentators assert that the right to privacy, which is
implicated in Internet surveillance by state governments, is one of
the most important human rights.69 Although the Internet is a
relatively new technology that came into existence long after the
establishment of the international law relating to privacy, the
relevance of the laws relating privacy to the Internet is obvious. As
U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression Frank La Rue has
asserted:
By explicitly providing that everyone has the right to express
him or herself through any media, the Special Rapporteur
underscores that article 19 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the Covenant was drafted with foresight
to include and to accommodate future technological
developments through which individuals can exercise their
right to freedom of expression. Hence, the framework of
international human rights law remains relevant today and
equally applicable to new communication technologies such
as the Internet.70
point in time.
69 See generally Alexandra Rengel, Privacy-invading Technologies and Recommendations for Designing a Better Future for Privacy Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 117 (2013); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475, 483 (1968); JAMES MICHAEL,
PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1–2 (1994).
70 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 21. See also U.N. Human
Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), ¶
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Despite the perceived applicability of old laws to new technology,
efforts to update legal instruments and create new laws that
expressly refer to these new technologies should be encouraged.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ICCPR provide
the fundamental international obligations when it comes to
privacy.71 These two instruments essentially require member states
to protect the exercise of the right to privacy and free
correspondence, the right to freedom of expression, and the right to
media.72
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”73
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
The reference to “any media and regardless of frontiers” in
Article 19 stands out when considered in the context of Internet
surveillance. Article 17 of the ICCPR represents an exact repeat of
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but with
some numbering added: “(1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation. (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”74

12 (“[The ICCPR] protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination.”).
71 See Andrew Hammond, Obama Needs to Repair Relations to Continue Fight
against Terrorism, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 31, 2013 (reporting that, in light
of the Snowden revelations about international NSA surveillance, “German and
Brazilian diplomats have reportedly begun drafting a UN General Assembly resolution calling for extending the [ICCPR] to [I]nternet activities.”).
72 See generally Land, supra note 22, at 394; The Right to Privacy in the Digital
Age, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013).
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at art 12 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
74 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200(XXI)(A),
U.N. Doc A/RES/2200, at art. 12 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
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Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights are similar:
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without
interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities.
It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these
shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.75
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR establishes “the right to freedom of
expression,” including “freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other
media of his choice.”76 Moreover, Article 19(3) provides several
legitimate restrictions to safeguard the rights of others.77 This media
clause creates the foundation for an emerging international law of
the Internet, which guarantees the right to the technologies of
connection, e-privacy and freedom of expression within the
Internet.78 Among all those different labels and expressions of
rights, the right to privacy is (or has been portrayed as) the most
important one, both with regard to government surveillance and
surveillance for commercial purposes.79
The question arises how these provisions and rights are to be
implemented. According to ICCPR Articles 2(2) and 2(3)(a), state
parties are obliged to take steps to adopt laws and measures that
75 Compare Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 73, at art.19 with
ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 19.
76 ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 19(2).
77 See id. at 19(3).
78 Id.
79 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶¶ 53–59.
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transform these international legal obligations into domestic laws.80
The 2011 report of the Special Rapporteur on Key Trends and
Challenges to the Right of All Individuals to Seek, Receive and
Impart Information and Ideas of All Kinds through the Internet
indicates that restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in
Article 19 has to go through a three-part, cumulative test:
a) It must be provided by law, which is clear and accessible
to everyone (principles of predictability and
transparency);
b) It must pursue one of the purposes set out in article 19
paragraph 3 of the Covenant, namely (i) to protect the
rights or reputations of others, or (ii) to protect national
security or of public order, or of public health or morals
(principle of legitimacy); and
c) It must be proven as necessary and the least restrictive
means required to achieve the purported aim (principles
of necessity and proportionality).81
Concerning the first point, any restriction should be provided by
(and only by) laws, which should clearly define the restriction and
its application process. Some key aspects to clarify include who can
access the data and how it can be used, as well as the method of
storage and the duration of storage.82 As the Special Rapporteur
noted:
The necessity of adopting clear laws to protect personal data
is further increased in the current information age, where
large volumes of personal data are collected and stored by
intermediaries, and there is a worrying trend of States
obliging or pressuring these private actors to hand over
information of their users.83
In general, the law needs to be crafted with adequate precision so
that people can adjust their conduct in order to comply with the law,
and the law must be knowable by the public, which are basic
characteristics of law in general.84 As the Special Rapporteur
80
81
82
83
84

ICCPR, supra note 74, at arts. 2(2), (2)(3)(a).
Id. at ¶ 24.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 56.
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–44 (1969).
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clarified, those restrictions have to relate directly to the initial needs
for the law in the first place.85 In sum, sufficient legal precision, legal
clarity, and limited items of application are the basic criteria when
assessing restrictions.86
Second, the purpose of those restrictions is limited to the
purposes listed in ICCPR Article 19(3).87 In particular, the basic
arrangement of this distinction between rights and restrictions and
between norms and exceptions must not be reversed.88 This point is
reflected in ICCPR Article 5(1), which states:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as
implying for any State, group or person any right to engage
in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of
any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the
present Covenant.89
Any restriction must precisely point to the type of threat involving
a basis provided in paragraph 3, thus creating a link between the
threat and the type of expression.90
Finally, the restriction should be necessary and in proportion
with regard to its objectives. In other words, there needs to be as
85 See U.N. Human Rights Council, CCPR General Comment No. 27, Art. 12,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (Nov. 2, 1999), ¶ 13 (“The laws authorizing the application of restrictions should use precise criteria and may not confer unfettered discretion on those charged with their execution.) [hereinafter Comment No. 27].
86 Vague and broad terms are clearly against this requirement, such as “promoting division between religious believers and non-believers,” “defamation of religion,” “inciting to violation,” “instigating hatred and disrespect against the ruling
regime,” “inciting subversion of state power” and “offences that damage public
tranquility.” Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 29.
87 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, ¶ 25.
88 Comment No. 27, supra note 85, ¶ 13.
89 ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 5(a).
90 See U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, Art. 19:
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), ¶ 36 (“[I]n order for the Committee to carry out
this function, a State party . . . must demonstrate in specific fashion the precise nature of the threat to any of the enumerated grounds . . . that has caused it to restrict
freedom of expression.”). See also U.N. General Assembly, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion
and Expression, A/66/290 (Aug. 10, 2011), ¶ 16 (stating that General Comment No.
34 on Article 19 “underscores that when a State invokes a legitimate ground for
restriction of the right to freedom of expression, it must demonstrate in specific and
individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat, the necessity and the proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by establishing a direct and
immediate connection between the expression and the threat”).
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few limitations as possible in order to encourage the free exchange
of information on the Internet, with the exception of “a few . . .
limited circumstances prescribed by international law for the
protection of other human rights.”91 The consequence of this
element is that it is absolutely clear that any disproportionate
restriction would violate the Covenant.92 Moreover, ICCPR Article
2(3)(a) sets out that there should be an effective remedy for any
violation of the listed rights or freedoms, and the remedy should be
determined by the designated authority within that state’s domestic
legal system.93
The Special Rapporteur also discussed the danger of states’
actions against individuals who communicate via the Internet,
which a state might try to justify as being necessary for the purpose
of combating terrorism or otherwise protecting national security, for
example. Even though international human rights law might not
prohibit such actions, it is important to note how Internet
surveillance often occurs due to political reasons, instead of security
reasons, which is entirely inappropriate.94
In sum, international law limits states in their efforts at Internet
surveillance from the human rights perspective mainly through the
right of privacy and the freedom of expression.95 In the end, these
provisions of international law essentially try to balance the freedom
of expression and other interests, such as public health, public order,
and national security. Restrictions on this freedom of expression
must be in accordance with the principle of proportionality,96 “must
Id. at ¶ 12.
See DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
INTERNET 252 (2007) (discussing the ICCPR’s jurisdiction).
93 ICCPR, supra note 74, at art. 2(3)(a).
94 See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 27, at ¶ 54 (“[S]urveillance
often takes place for political, rather than security reasons in an arbitrary and covert
manner.”).
95 This article also recognizes that the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) provides protection for undisclosed
information under Article 39(2) and its reference to actions that are “contrary to
honest commercial practices.” See generally Robin J. Effron, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Application of the Economic Espionage Act and the Trips Agreement, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1475 (2003); Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Internet, Cross-Border Trade in Services, and the GATS: Lessons From US Gambling, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 319, 351–52
(2006). However, this article is delimited by focusing on the human rights aspects,
not the trade-related aspects, which is reserved for future research on this topic.
96 See MANFRED NOWAK, UN COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 386–87 (1993) (maintaining that restrictions must be balanced against
reason behind such restrictions).
91
92
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be provided by law . . . and necessary.”97 Based on the dualism that
dominates the international system,98 it should not come as a
surprise if states have their own unique mechanisms and
approaches to Internet governance, although this does not diminish
the potential value in trying to harmonize these approaches.99
Regardless of the success of harmonization efforts, the obligations
described in this section continue to be applicable at the
international level. The next two parts describe the U.S. and Chinese
laws concerning Internet surveillance, with the aim of comparing
them with one another and with international standards to assess
quality and compliance with these standards.
3. U.S. LAW ON INTERNET SURVEILLANCE
The U.S. government conducts Internet surveillance either for
national security or law enforcement purposes. Distinct histories
have led to generally separate legislative frameworks for national
security and law enforcement, but the two categories are not
mutually exclusive. Both regulatory schemes are startlingly
outdated and tend to limit the amount of individualized suspicion
that the government must show before conducting surveillance.
This part focuses on analyzing the existing and proposed legislation
in light of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and
relevant policy considerations in an effort to evaluate the validity of
that legislation, especially in light of the international norms
concerning predictability.

97 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(3); see also
SVANTESSON, supra note 92, at 255.
98 See ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 54–
81 (9th ed., 1992); LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS & VALUES 64–74
(1995).
99 See David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in
Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 3, par. 10 (1995) (“One can imagine . . . bilateral
agreements between network users). See also Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty?: The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 647, 654 (1996)
(proposing ideas for a paradigm of effective cyberspace regulation); Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMM. LAW. CONSPECTUS 181, 185–88 (1997) (analyzing various attempts to
regulate cyberspace indirectly or regulating code directly).
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3.1. U.S. Constitution and Statutes
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forms the
foundation of privacy protection in the United States:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.100
This provision protects U.S. citizens from government action, but
not from private-sector behavior. However, in the private sphere,
service providers fear the business impact of being compelled to
disclose user data.101 Matters of law aside, the public perception that
technology companies allowed the government to access personal
data persists; and this perception has already cost industry players
billions of dollars.102 In December 2013, Silicon Valley competitors
formed a rare alliance to “address the practices and laws regulating
government surveillance of individuals and access to their
information.”103 The alliance created an ambitious set of principles
to guide personal surveillance reform. The principles call for
oversight, accountability and transparency in government behavior,
among other things; and the application of these standards prohibit
bulk data collection of electronic communication and ensure due
process in the courts that manage government data requests.104
Perhaps most ambitious of all is the call for a “robust, principled,
and transparent framework to govern lawful requests for data
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Nicole Ozer, U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein’s NSA “Reforms”: Bad for Privacy,
Bad for Business, THE SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 6, 2013,
www.mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_24665551/aclu-diane-feinsteins-nsareforms-bad-privacy-bad (“[T]he U.S. cloud computing industry stands to lose as
much as $35 billion as international customers find other cloud computing services
rather than risk their sensitive data falling into the NSA’s giant maw”).
102 See Claire C. Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies,
N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 21, 2014), www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/falloutfrom-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html?_r=0 (“[T]he United
States cloud computing industry could lose $35 billion by 2016 . . . . [T]he losses
could be as high as $180 billion, or 25 percent of industry revenue.”).
103 Global Government Surveillance Reform, Reform Government Surveillance,
www.reformgovernmentsurveillance.com (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
104 Id.
100
101
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across jurisdictions.”105 The degree of ambition embedded in these
principles can be seen only when compared with the current federal
legislation that regulates Internet surveillance, which the remainder
of this section focuses on.
The core federal statute regulating Internet surveillance by the
government is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(“ECPA”) of 1986.106 Despite decades of technological advances, the
legal framework currently upholding Americans’ privacy rights
was written five years before the creation of the World Wide Web.
The statute’s provisions are threefold. First, the Act expands
previously existing limitations on the government’s ability to
wiretap to also restrict the live surveillance of online data.107 Second,
the ECPA regulates the government’s use of “pen registers,” which
are devices used to report outgoing telephone numbers.108 Finally,
the statute’s most relevant provision, the Stored Communications
Act (“SCA”),109 provides privacy rights for consumers who rely on
email service providers, which the statue refers to as Electronic
Communications Service (“ECS”) providers.110 It also protects
consumers who use Remote Computing Services (“RCS”), or
external storage and data processors.111 The SCA regulates when the
government can force service providers to divulge users’
information and, as a separate matter, when information providers
are permitted to provide the government with their data.112
The SCA allows a service provider to disclose communications
to an agency dealing with law enforcement “if the contents were
inadvertently obtained by the service provider and appear to
Id.
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, 2701–12,
3121–26 (1986).
107 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22; Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 167 (2011) [hereinafter Bagley].
108 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3126; Bagley supra note 107, at 167.
109 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712. See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 373, 383 (2014) [hereinafter Kerr] (“But the most
complex part of the [ECPA], and the part that has become by far the most important
is . . . the Stored Communications Act.”).
110 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1); Bagley, supra note 107, at 167.
111 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702(a)(2).
112 Bagley, supra note 106, at 169. See also Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., 303 F.
Supp. 2d 121, 124 (D. Conn. 2004) (holding that the government must follow the
ECPA’s specific legal processes when attempting to obtain subscriber information
from a service provider).
105
106
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pertain to the commission of a crime.”113 The Act also allows a
service provider to disclose communications to a governmental
agency “if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person
requires disclosure without delay of communications relating to the
emergency.”114 The records of Electronic Communications Services
or Remote Computing Services, unlike the communications, receive
no protection from the Stored Communications Act.115
The statute distinguishes between real-time surveillance and
stored information, as well as between content and “non-content”
data, with information relating to the actual content of messages
receiving the most protection.116 The government must obtain a
warrant, which requires probable cause, before compelling the
disclosure of stored electronic data that has been on file for fewer
than 180 days; however, if the content of an email is older than 180
days, the government need only acquire a court order, which
requires showing just “specific and articulable facts showing that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the contents . . . are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”117 This
burden is more lax than the probable cause standard.
For non-content information, such as the address, time, and
location of sent messages, the government also may acquire a court
order in place of a warrant.118 In United States v. Forrester,119 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that non-content data
such as e-mail headers and IP addresses were analogous to penregister data and therefore were unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment.120
When Congress passed the ECPA, its primary concern was to
regulate the live monitoring of telephone communications in the
forms of wiretaps and pen registers.121 Legislators also were wary of
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (2013).
18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8).
115 18 U.S.C. at § §2703(c)(3).
116 See Kerr, supra note 109, at 385–86 (describing two amendments to the ECPA
that distinguish between types of electronic information based on how the information is stored and whether the information qualifies as content or non-content).
See also Bagley, supra note 107, at 168 (providing further explanation of the differences between stored information and real-time information).
117 18 U.S.C. §2703(d).
118 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
119 512 F.3d 500, 501 (9th Cir. 2007).
120 Id. at 504.
121 See Kerr, supra note 109, at 376 (“ECPA treated real-time wiretapping as the
113
114
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Remote Computing Services users, because before the invention of
complex business software, companies out-sourced the majority of
their financial information to third-party processors.122 However,
given the contemporary accessibility of online storage, regulating
Electronic Communications Service providers may actually be the
ECPA’s most important function. For example, many websites store
content and non-content information of users on a permanent basis,
and consumers are required to give that information to create an
account in order to use the website.123
Oren Kerr’s work on understanding and improving the ECPA
has made a significant impact on the field. In particular, Kerr points
out a number of aspects of the SCA that leave the government illequipped to give effect to the statute in modern times.124 The Fourth
Amendment requires that warrants provide particular information
about the area that is to be searched or property that is to be
seized.125 However, no provision of the ECPA offers such guidance:
if a service provider is permitted to disclose information, it may
disclose any information in its possession, without being limited by
time or limited to a certain user.126 Furthermore, the government is
free to peruse, and act on, any bulk information it receives,
regardless of the relevancy of that information to the original
information request; this is known as the state action doctrine.127
According to the state action doctrine, Fourth Amendment
protections and limitations apply to third parties only when thirdparty actions are linked to state actions.128 The most important case
on the subject is Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., where the Court
created a standard for deciding if the action of a private entity could
be deemed state action.129 In particular, the Court determined that
the actor must be involved in exercising “powers traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State” for the private actor to be engaged
chief privacy threat.").
122 Id. at 383.
123 Bagley, supra note 107, at 168.
124 Kerr, supra note 109, at 390–401.
125 Id. at 412.
126 Id. at 383-84.
127 Id. at 384. For reference to the state action doctrine, see Bagley, supra note
107, at 185–87.
128 See Bagley, supra note 107, at 185 (relying on Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465, 470–471, 475 (1921)).
129 419 U.S. 345, 346 (1974). See also Bagley, supra note 107, at 186 (outlining the
Jackson court’s test to distinguish private actors from state actors).
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in state action.130 The Jackson test is therefore a two-part test: the
action must be that which is traditionally exercised by state actors
and it must also be exclusively exercised by state actors.131
Since Jackson, the Court has relaxed the requirements of state
action, holding in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Association that an athletic entity of a private nature that
regulates public schools’ athletic programs actually are engaged in
state action because the organization was entwined with the state.132
In particular, the Court focused on the appointment by the state of
the company’s directors.133
The Courts of Appeals for the various circuits have interpreted
these rules differently. In United States v. Blocker,134 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit created an independent discovery
exception to the post-Jackson understanding of state action, noting
that a private actor working on behalf of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”) was not engaged in state action because the
insurance records that it recovered would have been uncovered
through a regular audit.135 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, conversely, enabled the finding of state action when it
modified the Jackson test in United States v. Miller.136 The Court held
that the determination of the existence of state action would be
based on “(1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in
the intrusive conduct, and (2) whether the party performing the
search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further its
own ends.”137 Although the distinction between a private entity
intending to assist law enforcement and furthering its own ends
often is a false choice because government coercion aligns its
interests with the interests of the private actor, this Article asserts
that, as a means to protect personal information as “papers and
effects” under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court should
adopt this standard, and failing that, Congress should amend the
Stored Communications Act to create this additional protection.

130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 346.
Bagley, supra note 107, at 186.
531 U.S. 288 (2001). Bagley, supra note 107, at 188.
Bagley, supra note 107, at 188.
104 F.3d 720 (5th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 727; Bagley, supra note 107, at 189.
688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 657.
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In addition to the issue involving state action, Congress has yet
to update the statute in light of scientific progress, and as a result,
the statute’s divisions between types of electronic data are difficult
to apply to modern technology. As Kerr writes:
ECPA’s distinctions made sense in a world in which few
records were created, few records were stored, and therefore
few records could be obtained. The statutory structure
presumes an absence of Fourth Amendment protection and
it also presumes a world of users, providers, and users all
inside the United States.138
According to Andrew William Bagley, the distinction between
Electronic Communications Services and Remote Computing
Services is outdated. The SCA treats these two differently because
“e-mail was originally stored only temporarily on third party
servers when in route from sender to receiver.”139 While this
distinction made sense historically, the use of cloud computing
through services such as iCloud, Gmail, Yahoo! Mail and Hotmail
leave non-content information dangerously exposed, because this
information is kept permanently on the cloud and therefore noncontent information can be given to the government easily after 180
days. The solution to this problem is to amend the SCA to eliminate
the outdated distinction between Electronic Communications
Services and Remote Computing Services is eliminated and give
both equal protection under the former Electronic Communications
Service standard.
As a statutory matter, the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act was not updated for law enforcement purposes until almost a
decade after its adoption. The Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (“CALEA”), which Congress passed in 1994,
enables law enforcement agencies to survey live communications.140
Generally, CALEA requires telecommunications carriers to provide
phone and Internet services that allow law enforcement officers with
court orders to conduct surveillance.141 The statute, which required
Kerr, supra note 109, at 390.
Bagley, supra note 107, at 168.
140 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1110 (2006). See also Nathan C. Henderson, The Patriot
Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing
Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179, 184 (2002) (detailing the Patriot Act’s
effect on government surveillance and describing the role of CALEA in this regard).
141 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT, www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/communications-assistance138
139
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carriers to update their technology, compels providers to allow the
government backdoor access to users’ data.142 In 2006, after an FBI
recommendation, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission
extended CALEA to cover Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP)
communications, a technology that uses the Internet to make phone
calls.143 More recently, in 2013, the FBI requested even further
overhauls to allow law enforcement agencies real-time surveillance
of email, instant messaging, and cloud computing services.144 In
2010 and 2013, the FBI requested that Congress expand its authority
under CALEA to “force all companies with messaging services to
engineer their products with a secret government backdoor and to
decrypt all encrypted messages.”145 According to James Dempsey,
the Executive Director of the Center for Democracy & Technology:

law-enforcement-act#introduction (last visited Feb. 9, 2015); Susan Landaum, Security, Wiretapping, and the Internet, IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY (2005), voip-billing-platform.com/documentation/pdf/Internet_Security_and_Wiretapping.pdf; Henderson, supra note 140, at 184–85.
142 Rebecca Jeschke, Plan for Internet ‘Backdoors’ Draws Coordinated Attack,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Oct. 16, 2005, available at http://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2005/10/plan-internet-backdoors-draws-coordinated-attack.
143 Mark Jaycox & Seth Schoen, The Government Wants a Backdoor Into Your
Online Communications, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, May 22, 2013, available
at http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/05/caleatwo (“CALEA forces telephone
companies to provide backdoors to the government so that it can spy on users after
obtaining court approval, and was expanded in 2006 to reach Internet technologies
like VoIP.”). See Micah Sher et al., Can They Hear Me Now? A Security Analysis of
Law Enforcement Wiretaps, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ACM CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (2009), available at http://www.crypto.
com/papers/calea-ccs2009.pdf (analyzing law enforcement wiretaps under
CALEA and their susceptibility to attacks by the intercept target).
144 See Ryan Gallager, FBI Pursuing Real-Time Gmail Spying Powers as “Top Priority” for 2013, SLATE, Mar. 26, 2013, www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/
03/26/andrew_weissmann_fbi_wants_real_time_gmail_dropbox_spying_power.
html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (“[T]he FBI wants the power to mandate real-time
surveillance of everything from Dropbox and online games . . . to Gmail and Google
Voice.”).
145 CALEA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Feb. 9, 2013, www.eff.org/
issues/calea. See also Kevin Bankston, Debate Over Internet Backdoors Heats Up in
Congress and in Court, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Feb. 16, 2011,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/02/congress-and-court-long-simmering-debate-over (“[We think] that any expansion of CALEA would be the very definition
of a bad idea, an ‘anti-privacy, anti-security, anti-innovation solution in search of a
problem.’”); Seth Schoen, Government Seeks Back Door Into All Our Communications,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Sept. 27, 2010, http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2010/09/government-seeks (“Trying to force technology developers to include
back doors is a recipe for disaster for our already-fragile on-line security and privacy.”).
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In some ways, interception might be less convenient, in that
law enforcement may have to go to different entities to
obtain content and routing information. And given the
diversity of services, the information will come in different
formats and law enforcement will have to work harder to
determine what it is intercepting. In other ways, however,
Internet surveillance will be easier, in that the digital nature
of communications makes them easier to analyze, store, and
retrieve.
Last year, for example, according to the
government’s official Wiretap Report, out of 1,442
authorized wiretaps nationwide, the ‘most active’ was the
interception of a broadband Internet line. The only question
– and it’s a big question – is whether additional authority is
needed for the government to insert certain features into
Internet services to make them easier to tap.146
The FBI is in the process of expanding law enforcement’s powers
even further, such that agencies would have the ability to compel
companies to comply or actually conduct wiretaps themselves.147
The FBI’s request, which would strengthen the compliance
requirements after the issuance of warrants, also would apply to
foreign telecommunications providers operating in the United
States and impose greater fines for noncompliance.148
146 Law Enforcement Access to Communication Systems in the Digital Age: Hearing
on H.R. Rep. No. 103-827 Before the H. Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 2 (2004) (statement of
James X. Dempsey, Executive Director, Center for Democracy & Tech.), available at
cdt.org/insight/law-enforcement-access-to-communications-systems-in-a-digitalage/.
147 18 U.S.C.§2518(4) (2013); Dempsey, supra note 146.
148 See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Wide Overhaul of Wiretap Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/us/politics/obama-mayback-fbi-plan-to-wiretap-web-users.html (“The Obama administration . . . is on the
verge of backing a Federal Bureau of Investigation plan for a sweeping overhaul of
surveillance laws that would make it easier to wiretap people who communicate
using the Internet.”); Declan McCullagh, FBI: We need wiretap-ready Web sites – now,
CNET, May 4, 2013, www.cnet.com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sitesnow/ (“The FBI is asking Internet companies not to oppose a controversial proposal
that would require firms, including Microsoft, Facebook, Yahoo, and Google, to
build in backdoors for government surveillance.”). An agency theory would be
tested by the use of fines. With the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, the
U.S. Supreme Court rationalized that, even though Congress does not have the
power to pass such legislation under its Commerce Power through use of fines to
encourage performance, Congress does have such authority under its taxing power.
Thus, this Act is only applicable to Americans who file taxes in the U.S. See Ellen
Nakashima, Proposal Seeks to Fine Tech Companies for Noncompliance with Wiretap Orders, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2013, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
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One of the core issues involving the use of CALEA to engage in
Internet surveillance is that it was not intended to be used for this
purpose. According to the testimony of Dempsey, CALEA was
intended to be part of a Public Switched Telephone Network
(“PSTN”), which it has not be successful as; instead, a new way must
be created that is suited to the “decentralized, innovative
Internet.”149 In his testimony, Dempsey focused on the differences
between the public switched telephone network and the Internet
noting that the Internet “supports not only voice, but also
photography, data, and video.”150 Unlike the PSTN with its
telephone operators, the Internet has no gatekeepers.151 Dempsey
mentioned that “CALEA is a 20th century statute for 20th century
technology” and that “CALEA was designed for the centralized,
relatively monopolized, and circuit switched world of the
traditional telephone common carriage – entities already subject to
a range of regulatory burdens.”152 According to the Committee
Report from the House Committee on the Judiciary, CALEA
obligations “do not apply to information services, such as electronic
mail services, or on-line services, such as CompuServe, Prodigy,
America Online or Mead Data, or Internet service providers.”153
According to the testimony of the Director of the FBI, CALEA was
“narrowly focused on where the vast majority of our problems
exist—the networks of common carriers, a segment of the industry
which historically has been subject to regulation.”154 In 1999, the
FCC determined that information services “such as electronic mail
providers and on-line service providers” are exempt from
CALEA.155 In United States Telecom Ass’n. v. FCC,156 the Court of

security/proposal-seeks-to-fine-tech-companies-for-noncompliance-with-wiretaporders/2013/04/28/29e7d9d8-a83c-11e2-b029-8fb7e977ef71_story.html (describing legislation that would pressure tech companies to comply with government
surveillance).
149 Dempsey, supra note 146.
150 Id.
151 See id. (detailing government surveillance in the Internet Age).
152 Id.
153 Telecommunications Carrier Assistance to the Government, H.R. REP. NO.
103–827(I), at 23 (1994) (quoted in Dempsey, supra note 146).
154 Dempsey, supra note 146.
155 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Second Report and
Order, 15 FCC Rcd 7105, at 26 (1999) (quoted in Dempsey, supra note 146).
156 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
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Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that “CALEA does not cover
‘information services’ such as e-mail and Internet access.”157
Dempsey offered three approaches to government interception
of Internet communication. First, CALEA could be applied to the
Internet as law enforcement agencies proposed in 2010 and 2013.158
Second, a service bureau could operate as a middleman between law
enforcement and the service provider, and the service bureau would
unpack, extract, and format the information for the convenience of
law enforcement.159 Third, law enforcement agencies could acquire
the ability to glean information from packet streams.160 Dempsey
advocates this third approach because, as he noted in his testimony
to the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet,
“Even CALEA only requires carriers to deliver call-identifying
information to law enforcement – it imposes no formatting
requirements on service providers.”161
Whereas Title III of the Wiretap Statute and the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act regulate domestic intelligence efforts,
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) of 1978 governs
surveillance for national security purposes.162 FISA allows the
government to conduct electronic surveillance and physical
searches of both foreigners and U.S. citizens.163 Law enforcement
agencies – namely, the FBI – can conduct wiretaps after showing that
the focus of an operation is a member of a terrorist organization, a
foreign power, or its agent.164
The government also must
demonstrate that the investigation exists to detect “foreign
intelligence information” and that it employs certain “minimization
Id.
See Dempsey, supra note 146.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 Id.
162 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2013), available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf.
163 Id. See also Stephanie C. Blum, What Really is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future Surveillance Reform, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 269,
275 (2008) (“FISA provides a statutory framework for the U.S. government to engage in electronic surveillance and physical searches to obtain ‘foreign intelligence
information.’”).
164 50 U.S.C. § 1084 (2013), available at it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1286 (quoted in The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA),
JUSTICE INFORMATION SHARING: U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, Sept. 19, 2013, https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1286).
157
158
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procedures.”165
FISA does not require the government to
demonstrate that a crime is imminent in order to receive a warrant;
the government only must show relevance to a terrorism
investigation – probable cause that the person under surveillance is
part of a terrorist organization or an “agent of a foreign power.”166
Under Title III, the government has a higher burden – it has to
demonstrate that there is probable cause that a search will uncover
evidence that a target is committing, or has or will commit, a
crime.167
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”), founded
by the statute, is tasked with overseeing the process by which
executive agencies conduct surveillance for national security
purposes.168 The FISC is composed of a panel of 11 judges, each of
whom serves a 7-year term.169 The Court of Review, composed of
three judges, hears appeals.170 U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
John Roberts appointed all of the Court’s judges unilaterally. Title I
of FISA requires the government to get judicial warrants from the
court in order to conduct electronic surveillance to satisfy national
security needs.171 Once an agency is granted a warrant, the statute
includes no requirement that the agency reports its activities back to
the court.172
On paper, the FISC’s procedural mechanisms seem to uphold
due process norms. As John Yoo observes:
FISA obviously strikes a compromise between the wartime
and criminal approaches to information gathering. It . . .
165 50 U.S.C. § 1084 (2013), available at it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&
page=1286. “Minimization principles,” according to the statute, are essentially procedures set by the Attorney General to ensure that the government does not disseminate confidential information found during its investigations. 50 U.S.C § 1801
(2013).
166 50 U.S.C. § 1804 (2013).
167 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
168 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804–05.
169 History of the Federal Judiciary: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_special_fisc.html
(last visited, Nov. 9, 2015).
170 Id.
171 50 U.S.C. § 1804. See also L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment's National
Security Exception: Its History and Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1396 (2013) (“FISA
requires that electronic surveillance during security investigations be conducted
pursuant to judicial authorization.”).
172 Jeremy D. Mayer, 9-11 and the Secret FISA Court: From Watchdog to Lapdog?,
34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 249, 250 (2002).
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bears strong resemblances to the criminal justice system,
such as the requirement of an individual target, probable
cause, and a warrant issued by a federal court.173
Nevertheless, FISC’s results tell a different story. In 2012, the
government applied to the FISC on 1,789 occasions to be allowed to
conduct surveillance of an electronic nature, and FISC granted every
one of those requests.174 In fact, between 1979 and 2012, government
agencies were granted 99.97% of all FISA warrant requests,175 which
might suggest to some that FISC might not be the best at upholding
due-process expectations.
Recent information leaks have brought much criticism to two
NSA programs. One collects non-content information, or “metadata,” from around the world, and the other reads emails belonging
to foreigners abroad.176 President Bush has admitted that he
instructed the NSA to conduct surveillance as part of a Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP) beginning after the attacks of September
11, 2001 and ending in 2007.177 However, the story begins before
former U.S. President George W. Bush. In 1995, Congress expanded
the government’s surveillance powers under FISA by allowing
physical searches.178 In 1998, Congress also allowed the government
to use trap-and-trace devices and pen registers to monitor
surveillance targets.179 In 2001, President Bush signed the Uniting
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“USA
Patriot Act”). The USA Patriot Act, created for both national
security and law enforcement purposes, firmly increased the federal
government’s ability to seek out terrorist communications, as well
173 John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance
Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 901, 905 (2014).
174 Letter from Peter J. Kadzik to The Honorable Harry Reid, U.S. Department
of Justice, Office of Legislative Affairs (April 30, 2013), available at www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf.
175 Conner Clark, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber
Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 125
(2014) (citing Evan Perez, Secret Court’s Oversight Gets Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (June 9,
2013),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887324904004578535670310514616).
176 Yoo, supra note 173, at 901–02.
177 Edward C. Liu, Reauthorization of the FISA Amendments Act, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, Apr. 8, 2013, at 4–5, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
intel/R42725.pdf.
178 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–29 (2013).
179 50 U.S.C. at §§ 1841–46 (2013).
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as improved the working relationship between foreign intelligence
investigators and criminal investigators, especially in relation to
combating global terrorism.180 The statute permits the government
to use pen registers on email communications and authorizes access
to stored electronic records, as well as adds terrorism and computer
crimes to the offenses included in Title III.181 Under the USA Patriot
Act, the government can conduct surveillance without seeking court
orders specific to the details of a given search.182
Some of the USA Patriot Act’s provisions also amended FISA by
lessening the burden required to acquire a FISC warrant.183 In
particular, it was established that the FISA court may issue a warrant
if foreign intelligence is “a significant purpose” of the investigation,
not just “the purpose.”184 It expands the amount of time the
government may conduct a search for national security purposes
180 Charles Doyle, The USA PATRIOT Act: A Legal Analysis, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, Apr. 5, 2002, at 1, available at www.fas.org/irp/crs/
RL31377.pdf.
181 Id. at 5.
182 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2013). According to § 2709, the Director of the FBI or assistant director designee may request the “name, address, length of service and local
and long distance toll billing records of a person or entity” if the Director or his
designee may request these records if the records are “relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities.” 18 U.S.C. §2709(b)(1). These National Security Letters (NSLs) are controversial, both because they are “widely used by the FBI to obtain data on Americans without court oversight” and because companies that receive less than 1,000
of these NSLs are prevented under the law from publicizing “both the content of
the NSLs and to the very fact that they received one.” Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Walks Back Transparency on National Security Letters, WASH. POST, Nov. 13,
2014, www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/11/13/justice-department-walks-back-transparency-on-national-security-letters/. In 2013, Judge
Susan Illston of the District Court of the Northern District of California held that 18
U.S.C. § 2709 is unconstitutional as the statute’s gag provision violated First
Amendment rights. National Security Letters Are Unconstitutional, Federal Judge Rules:
Court Finds NSL Statutes Violate First Amendment and Separation of Powers,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Mar. 15, 2013, www.eff.org/press/releases/national-security-letters-are-unconstitutional-federal-judge-rules.
183 See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015 1
(2011) [hereinafter Liu] (detailing the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act
of 2012 and its government surveillance consequences).
184 Jennifer L. Sullivan, From the Purpose to a Significant Purpose: Assessing the
Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act under the Fourth Amendment, 19 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 379 (2005); see also William Funk,
Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism in the United States, 80 MISS. L.J. 1491, 1501 (2011)
(noting that the change in FISA’s requirement from “the purpose” to “a significant
purpose” was done in light of allegations that “the purpose requirement had hobbled FBI intelligence and law enforcement cooperation”).
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and adds four members to the FISC so that the panel now includes
eleven judges.185 Notably, the Act also creates a claim mechanism
for privacy violations committed by the government.186 The FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 expanded the government’s surveillance
powers relative to its powers under the 1978 statute. Under these
provisions, a court order is necessary only where a “reasonable
expectation of privacy exists.”187 Reasonableness is determined
according to both subjective and objective elements: both the
individual and society must recognize that an expectation of privacy
existed in a particular case.188 Furthermore, the government needs
not show FISC that the areas it intends to search are currently being
used, or will later be used, by the target.189 Congress and the
President extended the FISA Amendments Act until 2017, and the
efforts of the ACLU and other advocacy organizations to challenge
the Amendments Act ultimately were unsuccessful.190
185 See Liu, supra note 183, at 15 (detailing the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of 2012 and its government surveillance consequences). Prior to 2008,
FISA provided that the eleven FISC judges had to be from “seven of the United
States judicial circuits.” 50 U.S.C. §1803(a). A reading of this statute created a possible ambiguity in that it could be read to require that all eleven judges come from
only seven judicial circuits. To address this ambiguity, the FISA Amendments Act
of 2008 amended the statutory language adding the words “at least” before the
word “seven.” Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 109(a); ASHLING GALLAGHER, §5:3 THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT – THE FISC’S PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES, No. 2,
(2013), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/2469--53-the-foreignintelligence-surveillance-courtthe (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
186 See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30465, THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND
U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT AND U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW DECISIONS 1 (2007), available at fas.org/sgp/crs/
intel/RL30465.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting that the USA Patriot Act substantially expanded the reach of the business records provisions to provide a mechanism for production of any tangible thing pursuant to a FISA court order).
187 Electronic Surveillance Within The United States For Foreign Intelligence
Purposes, Pub L. No. 95–511 §101(f), 92 Stat. 1783 (1978).
188 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
189 See EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF
THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 9 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter REAUTHORIZATION] (contrasting FISC with FISA by showing that FISA traditionally required an application
to identify the facilities that will be searched or subject to electronic surveillance,
and to demonstrate that those facilities are being used, or are about to be used, by
the target).
190 See REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189, at 2 (“On December 30, 2012, President Obama signed H.R. 5949, the FISA Amendments Act Reauthorization Act of
2012, which extends Title VII of FISA until December 31, 2017”).
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In 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama signed the Patriot Sunsets
Extension Act of 2011, which put four-year sunsets on roving
surveillance, and the request for production of business records
under Section 215.191 Unless the sunset clauses of these provisions
are extended, they will expire on June 1, 2015.192 On December 31,
2012, President Obama signed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (“FISA”) Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2012, which
extends Title VII of FISA until December 31, 2017.193 President
Obama pledged to cut the number of people under NSA
surveillance by increasing the required proximity of those surveyed
to an investigation.194 FISA and the USA Patriot Act both have been
extended and reaffirmed by Congress and the President through
2015 and 2017, respectively.195
Some commentators argue that the president wields executive
power to conduct warrantless searches without FISA and the USA
Patriot Act. For example, according to John Yoo, “FISA ultimately
cannot limit the President’s powers to protect national security
through surveillance if those powers stem from his unique Article II
responsibilities.”196 To him, FISA actually is a Presidential “safe
harbor,” guaranteeing that the surveillance is conducted within the
bounds of the Fourth Amendment.197 Executive Order 12333, which
was enacted by former U.S. President Ronald Reagan and expanded
by former U.S. President George W. Bush, gives the U.S. Attorney
General wide-ranging power to approve methods of acquiring

191 Under Section 206 of the USA Patriot Act, FISA was amended to add a degree of flexibility in identifying the target of surveillance. Liu, supra note 183, at 1.
Wiretaps that meet these revised generalized standards are called roving wiretaps
because, to a certain extent, they move around and follow the designated target.
192 Laura K. Donahue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 499 n.523
(2012).
193 REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189.
194 See Fred Kaplan, Pretty Good Privacy, SLATE, Jan. 17, 2014, at 2,
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2014/01/
obama_s_nsa_reforms_the_president_s_proposals_for_metadata_and_the_
fisa.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (noting the reform decreased the number of
“hops” that the NSA can make, in fanning out its surveillance, from three to two).
195 REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189; Jim Abrams, Patriot Act Extension Signed
By Obama, HUFFINGTON POST POLITICS, July 26, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2011/05/27/patriot-act-extension-signed-obama-autopen_n_867851.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
196 Yoo, supra note 173, at 923.
197 Id. at 930.
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national security intelligence information.198
According to
Executive Order 12333, intelligence agencies are to “collect, retain or
disseminate information concerning United States persons only in
accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency
concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with
the authorities provided in part 1 of this order . . . .”199 Under
Executive Order 12333, the following information is made available
for collection, retention or dissemination: “(a) [i]nformation that is
publicly available or collected with the consent of the person
concerned; (b) [i]nformation constituting foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence . . . ; [i]ncidentally obtained information that
may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal,
state, local or foreign laws; and (j) [i]nformation necessary for
administrative purposes.”200 It is this incidental obtaining of
information that privacy advocacy groups such as the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) object to.201 According to EPIC,
“Executive Order 12333 authorizes the collection of not only
metadata, but of the actual communications of U.S. citizens, so long
as the communications are collected ‘incidentally.’”202 EPIC also
accuses the NSA of using Executive Order 12333 as a justification to
intercept unencrypted data between Google and Yahoo’s data
centers, and that has been verified by The Guardian.203 A recently
declassified file produced by the Director of National Intelligence
(“DNI”) and redacted prior to publication requires that all
information incidentally acquired by intelligence officials be
immediately destroyed unless: “the Attorney General determines
that the contents indicate a threat of death or serious bodily harm to
any person” or if international communications contain
“[s]ignificant foreign intelligence, or . . . [a]nomalies that reveal a
potential vulnerability to U.S. communications security.”204
18 U.S.C. §2511(2)(f) (2013); REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 189 at 3.
Bazan, supra note 186, at 6.
200 Id. at 6–7.
201 Electronic Privacy Information Center, Exec. Order No.112333, available at
epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/.
202 Id.
203 Id; Spencer Ackerman, NSA Reformers Dismayed After Privacy Board Vindicates Surveillance Dragnet, THE GUARDIAN, July 2, 2014, at 3, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/02/nsa-surveillance-government-privacy-board-report?CMP=ema_565 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
204 LEGAL COMPLIANCE AND U.S. PERSONS MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, (U.S. NAT.
SEC. AGENCY 2011), § 5.4, available at www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/
CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
198
199
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Executive Order 12333 has been extensively amended—by
Executive Order 13284,205 by Executive Order 13355206 and by
Executive Order 13470.207 Executive Order 13284 amends Executive
Order 12333 by creating the Department of Homeland Security.208
Executive Order 13470 amends Executive Order 12333 by formally
unifying the intelligence community under the Director of National
Intelligence (“DNI”),209 and the 2008 amendments to Executive
Order 12333 include language acknowledging and protecting civil
liberties such as the following: the Government “has the solemn
obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities
under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States
persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights
guaranteed by Federal law.”210
A general theme that can be unearthed from this recitation of
data is that statutes concerning the right to privacy regarding papers
and effects have changed in two fundamental ways. First, modern
statutes such as the USA Patriot Act have allowed for the use of
modern technology to engage in traditional law enforcement
activities. Because of the increasing role of technology both from the
perspective of the user and of law enforcement, legitimate questions
can be raised as to the objectively reasonable expectation of privacy
that the user has over those communications and that information.
After all, if law enforcement has not entered into a constitutionally
protected area over which an objectively reasonable expectation of
privacy can be said to exist, no search has occurred and the Fourth
Amendment protections are not implicated. The second theme in
modern statutes, especially the USA Patriot Act, is the increased
collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement.
Historically, greater invasions were permitted into the privacy of
persons because of national security and the ability of intelligence
agents and agencies to quickly and reliably access information has
205 See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-01-27/pdf/WCPD-2003-01-27-Pg101.pdf (last visited Feb.
9, 2015).
206 See generally 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004).
207 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (Aug. 4, 2008).
208 See generally 68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2003-01-27/pdf/WCPD-2003-01-27-Pg101.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
209 See generally 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.gpo.
gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-08-04/pdf/E8-17940.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
210 Id. at §2(1.1)(b).
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prevented terrorist attacks. The issues that this creates are two-fold.
First, liberty and security should at the very least be viewed as a
balancing test between competing interests. Second, because of the
collaboration between intelligence and law enforcement, law
enforcement can now perform its function under a lower nationalsecurity standard.
With these points in mind, the following section explores the
recent efforts at legislative reform when it comes to Internet
surveillance. Again, these reforms are assessed in light of
predictability norms.
3.2. Efforts at Legislative Reform
A number of legislative efforts aim to update the existing
regulatory scheme on government Internet surveillance. This
section outlines the major legislative efforts.
3.2.1. The USA Freedom Act
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), the Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, and Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WIS), a USA
Patriot Act author, have proposed an ambitious, bipartisan and
bicameral legislative effort entitled the Uniting America by
Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-Collection
and Online Monitoring Act (“USA Freedom Act”).211 A reform bill
called the USA Freedom Act is currently in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.212 The Senate version of the Bill,213
211 Patrick Leahy & Jim Sensenbrenner, The Case for NSA Reform, POLITICO,
October 28, 2013, at 2, www.politico.com/story/2013/10/leahy-sensenbrennernsa-reform-98953.html#ixzz2wqt0Bcm6 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015). See also ACLU
Strongly Supports Sensenbrenner-Leahy Bill Reforming NSA Surveillance Authorities,
AM. CIV. LIBR. UNION, (Oct. 29, 2013), www.aclu.org/national-security/aclustrongly-supports-sensenbrenner-leahy-bill-reforming-nsa-surveillance (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter ACLU] (“No longer will the government be able to
employ a carte-blanche approach to records collection or enact secret laws by covertly reinterpreting congressional intent.”).
212 Mark Jaycox, A Deep Dive into the House’s Version of Narrow NSA Reform: The
New USA Freedom Act, Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 18, 2014, available at
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/05/us-house-moves-forward-narrow-nsareform-after-year-eye-opening-revelations (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) [hereinafter
Jaycox].
213 S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014).
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sponsored by Senators Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WIS) and Patrick
Leahy (D-VT), would close a current loophole that allows the NSA
to engage in “warrantless searches for the phone calls or emails of
law-abiding Americans,”214 bring more transparency to the FISA
court and create an advocate for members of the public to represent
them before the FISA court.215 Whereas the Senate version of the bill
focuses on fixing section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act,216 the
House version seeks to create additional transparency within the
FISA court processes by allowing the FISA court to assign amicus
briefs to be written by outside interested parties in important cases
and to create reports that would track the number of accounts and
customers who are affected by FISA court orders.217 The Senate
version of the USA Freedom Act would amend the FISA
Amendments Act of 2008 (“FAA”) by restricting searches of FAAcollected data to non-U.S. persons unless there is an emergency or
unless law enforcement receives a court order from the FISA
court.218 The Act would curtail the government’s powers under the
USA Patriot Act and would prohibit the bulk collection of data that
Americans have shared with third parties.219 The Act also would
weaken FISA powers by publicizing its opinions and creating a
government advocate to guide its decision-making processes.220
3.2.2. The FISA Improvements Act
Senator Diane Feinstein (D-CA) proposed the FISA
Improvements Act,221 a bill that critics assert codifies the NSA’s
214 James Ball & Spencer Ackerman, NSA Loophole Allows Warrantless Search for
US Citizens’ Emails and Phone Calls, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2013, at 1,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantlesssearches-email-calls (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
215 Jaycox, supra note 212.
216 Id.
217 H.R. 3361, 113th Cong. § 401 (2013); Jaycox, supra note 212.
218 Michelle Richardson, The USA Freedom Act is Real Spying Reform, THE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION—WASHINGTON MARKUP, Oct. 29, 2013,
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/usa-freedom-act-real-spying-reform.
219 Dustin Volz, Feinstein’s NSA Bill Is Officially on Life Support, NAT. J. (Dec. 8,
2013), available at www.nationaljournal.com/technology/feinstein-s-nsa-bill-isofficially-on-life-support-20131218 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
220 ACLU, supra note 211.
221 S. 1631, 114th Cong. (2015).
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existing practices.222 The bill would explicitly allow the NSA to
search foreign communications for data pertaining to Americans.223
Although Section 6 is entitled “Restrictions on Querying the
Contents of Certain Communications,” it allows the intelligence
community to search data not only for the purpose of gaining
foreign intelligence information, but also for the broad purpose of
assessing the importance of that information.224 However, the NSA
would have to report its investigations in a record to Congress and
various government agencies.225 Although the FISA Improvements
Act of 2013 has made it out of the Senate Judiciary Committee with
the support of the testimony of the Obama Administration,226 no
further action has been taken on the bill.227
3.2.3. E-mail Privacy Act and Electronic Communications Privacy
Act Amendments Act of 2013
The Email Privacy Act, the House companion bill to The
Electronic Communications Privacy Amendments Act of 2013,228
introduced by Representative Kevin Yoder (R-KS), Representative
Tom Graves (R-GA) and Representative Jared Polis (D-CO),
represents yet another bi-partisan effort to limit the government’s
powers when it comes to surveillance. The Act, an EPCA update,
would prohibit service providers from disclosing email information
to the government without a warrant, strengthen notice
requirements by requiring that persons under surveillance receive a
copy of that warrant within ten business days of the date of issue
and remove existing distinctions between email that has been stored
222 Volz, supra note 219; Spencer Ackerman, Feinstein Promotes Bill to Strengthen
NSA’s Hand on Warrantless Searches, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 15, 2013,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/feinstein-bill-nsa-warrantless-searches-surveillance (last visited Feb. 9, 2015)[hereinafter Ackerman].
223 FISA Improvements Act of 2013, at §6, available at www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs113th/113fisa_improvements.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
224 Id. at § 6(1).
225 Id. at §6(2). See also Ackerman, supra note 222.
226 Rainey Reitman, 54 Civil Liberties and Public Interest Organizations Oppose the
FISA Improvements Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, Dec. 18, 2013,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/54-civil-liberties-and-public-interestorganizations-oppose-fisa-improvements-act (last visit Feb. 9, 2015).
227 S. 1631, 113th Cong. (2013); FISA Improvements Act of 2013, available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1631 (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
228 S. 607, 113th Cong. §§ 2–6 (2013).
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for more or less than 180 days.229 Despite reports that the E-Mail
Privacy Act is gaining steam in the House, the bill has yet to even
pass through the committee.230
3.2.4. The FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013
The FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013, cosponsored by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CN), Mike Lee, (RUT), Jon Tester (D-MT), Mark Udall (D-CO) and Ron Wyden (DOR), if passed, would have the following effects. The Act would
narrow the scope of court orders from the FISA Court under Section
215 of the USA Patriot Act by demanding that the government show
“both relevance to an authorized investigation and a link to a foreign
group or power.”231 The bill also allows people to challenge nondisclosure orders in court and expands reporting on the use of
national security letters.232 The bill also would shift from June 2017
to June 2015 the sunset date for the FISA Amendments Act of 2008
(“FAA”).233 Finally, the bill would require the Inspector General to
conduct a comprehensive review of the provisions of the FAA and
its impact on the privacy rights of Americans234 and issue a yearly
report to demonstrate such findings.235 The FISA Accountability

229 See Email Privacy Act, H.R. 1852, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1852#summary/libraryofcongress (updating the “privacy protections for electronic communications information that is
stored by third-party service providers in order to protect consumer privacy interests while meeting law enforcement needs”).
230 See Kate Tummarello, An End to Warrantless Email Searches?, THE HILL BLOG,
Mar. 2, 2014, available at thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/199625support-builds-in-house-for-ending-warrantless-email#ixzz2wqgxfjMi (describing
the obstacles erected by civil agencies for the bill).
231 See Zach Miners, New Privacy Bill Aims at Reforming FISA and the Patriot Act,
INFOWORLD, (June 25, 2013), www.infoworld.com/article/2610911/federalregulations/new-privacy-bill-aims-at-reforming-fisa-and-the-patriot-act.html (describing the effects of the provisions of the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Bill of 2013).
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 See Dana Liebelson, Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and Twitter Have a New Lobbying
Target—the NSA, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2013/11/nsa-bills-google-facebook-yahoo-twitter-lobbying (listing the
eight “pro-transparency” bills most watched by the tech industry).
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and Privacy Protection Act was referred to committee in 2013 and
no further action has been taken on the bill. 236
Two general themes of the reform legislation are, first, an
attempt at increasing the proportionality of government
surveillance with the necessity of counter-terrorism operations and,
second, an increase in the transparency of the government
surveillance process. Arguably, widespread Internet surveillance is
necessary to protect the people from terrorism and other threats;
however, to be in accordance with the standards of international
law, those measures must be proportional to necessity. Whereas the
Senate version of the USA Freedom Act, the E-mail Privacy Act and
the FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013 each act
to increase the proportionality of the surveillance to the necessity of
it, the House version of the USA Freedom Act and the FISA
Improvements Act, along with the other three bills, act to increase
the transparency of the government surveillance processes.
This section has explored and analyzed the U.S. legislation
concerning Internet surveillance with an eye to assessing
predictability. The following section analyzes U.S. case law with the
same purpose.
3.3. U.S. Case Law
Historically, Fourth Amendment queries were based upon a
theory of trespass, which required physical entry.237 U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead was one of the first
incarnations of the idea of a reasonable expectation of privacy, and
this idea was canonized by the Supreme Court of the United States
in Katz v. United States.238 In Katz, the Court abandoned the
236 See FISA Accountability and Privacy Protection Act of 2013, S. 1215, 113th
Cong. (2013), available at www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s1215 (improving
protections for privacy rights while increasing oversight of federal surveillance programs).
237 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the
wire-tapping of defendant’s phone conversations did not constitute a violation of
his constitutional rights).
238 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1967) (holding Fourth
Amendment protections to be applicable to all areas where citizens have reasonable
expectations of privacy). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534
(1967) (holding that the Fourth Amendment applies not only to searches for evidence regarding a criminal prosecution but instead applies to all government
searches); William Funk, Electronic Surveillance of Terrorism in the United States, 80
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restriction of Fourth Amendment protections to literal “persons,
houses, papers and effects”239 and created the following test: first,
did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy under the
circumstances and according to the view of the Court, and second,
was the person’s expectation of privacy objectively reasonable
under the circumstances?240 This objective test created by Justice
Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz created what Jed Rubenfeld
refers to as a logical trap of circular reasoning and self-validation.241
If a means of government surveillance becomes common
knowledge, people no longer have an objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to information thus put under
surveillance. This also implicates the predictability principle. The
court’s main weapon against this trap of logic is what many authors
have referred to as the Stranger Principle.242 There are two questions
that one must ask when defining what an objective reasonable
expectation of privacy is.243 First, how should law enforcement act
if law enforcement was a stranger?244 Second, if law enforcement
was not present or not in surveillance, what would we have exposed
to perfect strangers?245 Rubenfeld argues that the second question
is more important.246 In essence, the Stranger Principle (which
removes Fourth Amendment protection from information
voluntarily given to third parties) is the only cure for the circular
reasoning created by the objective reasonable expectation of privacy

MISS. L. J. 1491, 1493–94 (2011) (arguing that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act is a reasonable compromise between privacy concerns and security interests in
the age of international terrorism).
239 U.S. Const. amend. IV. See also Nathan C. Henderson, The Patriot Act’s Impact on the Government’s Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing Domestic
Communications, 52 DUKE L. J. 179, 181–82 (2002) (describing Katz’s role in overruling
Olmsted and Justice Harlan’s necessary conditions for Fourth Amendment protections).
240 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (Justice Harlan concurring). For examples of this test being used, see generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
241 See Rubenfeld, supra note 9, at 103-04 (describing the most obvious problems with “expectations-of-privacy” analysis).
242 See id. at 107, 110 (explaining the Stranger Principle as: “to the extent we
have opened something otherwise private to a perfect stranger, the police may intrude as well”).
243 See id. at 109 (noting the pitfalls associated with erroneous definitions of
“objective reasonable expectations” of privacy).
244 See id. at 109–10 (describing the “reasoning like a stranger” question).
245 See id. at 110–11 (describing the Stranger Principle).
246 See id. at 109 (emphasizing the importance of the Stranger Principle).
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test, and it also effectively kills Fourth Amendment protection of
information, especially in the modern era.247
This objective test for reasonableness relies substantially on the
common access to and use of technology to create the expectation of
privacy. Katz v. United States and Kyllo v. United States are good
examples.248 Katz involved the use of a phone booth to engage in
illegal activity, whereas Kyllo involved the use of a thermal imaging
device by the police to detect the growing of marijuana plants in
someone’s home. Read together, these cases stand for the
proposition that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy
over certain things and over certain areas depending upon the
circumstances, and law enforcement can only use ordinarilyaccessible means to access protected information without a warrant.
Most relevant for this discussion is the effects of modern technology
and notice on surveillance.
In three important recent cases, United States v. Jones,249 Riley v.
California, 250 and Klayman et. al. v. Obama et. al.,251 the courts have
distinguished those cases from presumably controlling precedent
on the grounds that the difference in technology allowed for a more
intrusive invasion of privacy and therefore a search under the
Fourth Amendment. The following sub-sections analyze those
cases.
See generally id.
In Katz, the Court held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a phone booth against a phone tap. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Kyllo, the Court
held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home against
a thermal imaging device used by the police because those devices are not readily
available to members of the public. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Using Katz as an analogy, the
Internet is becoming an increasingly common means for people to access and transmit information. Therefore, people should have an increasingly reasonable expectation of privacy that the information that they access and the information that they
transmit on the Internet will not be accessible to the government and to law enforcement without a warrant. Using Kyllo as an analogy, the means by which the
government engages in Internet and telephone surveillance is not commonly accessible to members of the public – for example, using super-computers that can store
meta-data. Therefore, people should have an objective reasonable expectation of
privacy that access and transmission of information will not be accessible to the
government or to law enforcement without a warrant.
249 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (holding that the attachment of a tracking device on a vehicle constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
250 See Riley v. California 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (holding that search warrants for cell phone data cannot be dispensed with on the basis of officer safety or
evidence preservation).
251 957 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).
247
248
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3.3.1. United States v. Jones
United States v. Jones and United States v. Maynard are companion
cases. Jones and Maynard were convicted of conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine. 252 One
of the means by which the police became aware of information used
to indict and eventually convict the defendants was the use of GPS
tracking technology.253 Jones, but not Maynard, argued that his
conviction should be overturned because the police violated the
Fourth Amendment by engaging in an unreasonable search when
the police used GPS technology to track his movements twenty-four
hours a day for twenty-eight days without a warrant.254 The
government argued that United States v. Knotts255 is controlling, but
the D.C. Circuit Court disagreed. In Knotts, the Court held that “[a]
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place
to another.”256
In distinguishing Knotts from Jones, the D.C. Circuit Court, and
later the Supreme Court, focused on the duration and scope of the
search, or as Kerr calls it, the mosaic theory of the Fourth
Amendment.257 This approach can be contrasted with a sequential
approach to determining whether or not and at what time a search
occurs.258 Under the historical sequential approach to Fourth
Amendment analysis, each action of law enforcement is judged on
an individual basis to determine whether such action constitutes
inside or outside surveillance.259 Law enforcement entrance into a
place where people have a reasonable expectation of privacy (or

252 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 548 (D.C. Cir, 2010) (holding
that warrantless placements of GPS tracking devices on motor vehicles constitute
searches).
253 Id. at 560.
254 Id.
255 615 F. 3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir, 2010).
256 Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)).
257 See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
258 See id. at 313 (characterizing the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment
as an analysis that emphasizes the collective sequence of steps over time).
259 See id. at 316 (describing the “historical sequential approach”).
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inside surveillance) constitutes a search.260
Judge Ginsburg
reasoned in Maynard that “dragnet-type” law enforcement
practices” might trigger “different constitutional principles.”261 This
means that the courts likely will distinguish in the future, as they
have in the past, between the scope of the investigation made
broader by modern technology.
3.3.2. Riley v. California
In Riley v. California, a unanimous Supreme Court held that
“[t]he police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital
information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been
arrested.”262 The respondents relied upon two main arguments to
justify the warrantless searches of Riley and Wurie (a companion
case). First, cell phones are compact and can be carried on
someone’s person, therefore they can be searched incident to a
lawful arrest.263 The second argument used by the respondents to
justify a warrantless search of cell phones is that cell phones are
materially indistinguishable from land line phones and therefore
data on cell phones can be searched (for instance call logs) because
that information is given to the mobile phone carrier and therefore
the Stranger Principle is implicated.264
In Chimel v. California, the Supreme Court held that a search of
an arrestee’s person and the area “within his immediate control” is
reasonable and therefore a warrant for such a search is not
260 See id. at 316–17 (framing reasonable searches as observation, and unreasonable searches as involving some type of entrance into an enclosed, private
space). To the extent that a trespass of chattels theory still is used to determine the
existence of a search, such as in Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in United States
v. Jones, such a theory is best understood as part of the sequential approach. Kerr,
supra note 257, at 317.
261 Id. at 324 (quoting United States v. Maynard, 615 F. 3d at 556–58).
262 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2480.
263 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 757 (1969) (holding that police officers
arresting a person in their place of residence can only search the area within the
immediate reach of the person); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)
(holding that personal searches of the arrested is allowed by the Fourth Amendment); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (holding that the arresting officers
must show a physical threat posed by the arrested or the potential destruction of
evidence in order to justify a vehicular search without a warrant after the vehicle’s
occupants have been arrested).
264 Riley, 134 S.Ct. at 2493.
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required.265 The rationales that the Court used to come to this
conclusion were the protection of the arresting officers’ safety and
the preservation of evidence.266 In United States v. Robinson, the
Court abandoned the arresting officers’ safety and preservation of
evidence rationales and adopted a categorical rule that all searches
incident to a lawful arrest are inherently reasonable and therefore a
warrant is not necessary.267 In Arizona v. Gant, the Court extended
the Chimel doctrine to the warrantless search of a vehicle’s passenger
compartment “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.”268
In Riley, the Court rejected the Chimel considerations of officer
safety and preservation of evidence as applicable to cell phones and
abandoned the categorical rule that it had embraced in Robinson.269
The Court in Riley also clarified that the claimed extension of Chimel
to Gant was not an extension at all; rather, the search was found to
be reasonable because of “circumstances unique to the vehicle
context.”270 In other words, a search of the passenger compartment
of a car was deemed to be reasonable absent a warrant, not because
the search happened incident to a lawful arrest, but rather because
the search was deemed reasonable due to the added exigency of
searching an automobile.
The Court in Riley found importance in the special nature of cell
phones, noting that “a cell phone collects in one place many distinct
types of information . . . ; a cell phone’s capacity allows even just
one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible . . . ; the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of
the phone, or even earlier. . . ; [and] there is an element of
pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones, but not physical
records.”271 The Court in Riley effectively analogized cell phones,
especially smart phones, to computers, thereby eliminating the

Chimel, at 762–63 (1969).
See id. at 763, 768 (explaining the logic behind allowing officers to search the
immediate vicinity of the offender).
267 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment allows such searches under the auspices of reasonableness).
268 Arizona v. Grant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J. concurring in judgment).
269 Riley v. California, 134 U.S. 2473, 2481–82 (2014).
270 Grant, 556 U.S. at 343.
271 Riley, 134 U.S. at 2490–91.
265
266
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problem of the Stranger Principle and the precedent of Smith v.
Maryland.272
Not only is modern surveillance technology changing the courts’
approach to Fourth Amendment law, but so are the revelations of
those means of surveillance leaked by The Guardian and Edward
Snowden. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, NGO groups
contested the constitutionality of Section 702’s warrantless
surveillance.273 Their effort was appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which dismissed the case for lack of standing.274 A 5–4
majority held that the plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizens who
believed themselves likely targets of Section 1881 surveillance, could
not show that they had suffered harm that was “concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent.”275 As Adam Liptak of the
New York Times noted, “[T]he ruling illustrated how hard it is to
mount court challenges to a wide array of antiterrorism measures . .
. in light of the combination of government secrecy and judicial
doctrines limiting access to the courts.”276
3.3.3. Klayman et al v. Obama et al.
In Klayman et. al. v. Obama et. al., the Court held that the plaintiffs
had standing to sue on constitutional grounds, specifically on the
question of whether Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act was
constitutional based on Fourth Amendment standards and
additionally held that Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act was
unconstitutional.277 As for the standing argument, Judge Leon
reasoned that Klayman is different from Clapper in that the plaintiffs
in Clapper were unaware at the time of the suit (prior to Snowden’s
NSA revelations) of the scope of NSA surveillance and therefore the
272 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 745–46 (1979) (holding that a person
has no reasonable expectation of privacy with phone numbers given to a third party
- in this case the telephone company).
273 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,133 U.S. 1138 (2013).
274 For other cases dismissed for lack of standing involving FISA, see Mayfield
v. United States, 588 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that because the appellees
signed a settlement agreement in which they agreed to not seek injunctive relief,
the appellees lacked standing).
275 Clapper, 133 U.S. at 1138.
276 Adam Liptak, Justices Turn Back Challenge to Broader U.S. Eavesdropping, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/us/politics/supreme-courtrejects-challenge-to-fisa-surveillance-law.html.
277 See Klayman et al. v. Obama et al., 957 F.Supp.2d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).
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likelihood that the NSA would have such information.278 The
Klayman plaintiffs, however, filed suit shortly after Snowden’s
revelations became public and therefore, according to Judge Leon,
“can point to strong evidence that, as Verizon customers, their
telephony metadata has been collected for the last seven years (and
stored for the last five) and will continue to be collected barring
judicial or legislative intervention.”279
Given the recent ruling in Klayman, it is difficult to agree with
the assumption that the courts will hold knowledge of surveillance
against the people when it comes to defining what is and what is not
a reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact, if Klayman proves
anything, it is that the more we know about the surveillance used
against us as people, the more protections we are provided by the
courts. This is especially true with regard to standing, but might not
prove to be true with regard to Fourth Amendment claims.
3.3.4. The ECPA Cases and the SCA Cases
The Stored Communications Act’s first constitutional challenge
came in the 2007 case of United States v. Warshak.280 Steven Warshak,
who ran a nutrition supplement company, allegedly committed a
number of crimes relating to money laundering and fraud.281 In
investigating the case, the government requested that Warshak’s
Internet service provider (“ISP”) store his emails and eventually
turn them over to investigators; it was after the government used
incriminating information from his email history to convict him that
the case reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.282
The Court held that Warshak’s email was subject to Fourth
Amendment protections, such that the government must show
probable cause, in the form of a warrant, before accessing his data.283
According to the Court, Warshak’s subjective expectation of privacy
in his email communications was objectively reasonable.284 He
See id. at 26.
Id.
280 United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
281 Id. at 274.
282 Id. at 282. See generally Courtney M. Bowman, A Way Forward After Warshak:
Fourth Amendment Protections for E-mail, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (2012).
283 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
284 Id.
278
279
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“plainly manifested an expectation that his emails would be
shielded from outside scrutiny,” and his belief was deemed
reasonable because “[g]iven the fundamental similarities between
email and traditional forms of communication, it would defy
common sense to afford emails lesser Fourth Amendment
protection.”285 Importantly, the Sixth Circuit also held the Stored
Communications Act to be unconstitutional, insofar as it allowed the
government to acquire information without a warrant.286 Still,
because officers acted in good faith based on a provision that was
not obviously unconstitutional, the acquired evidence was still
admissible in Warshak’s criminal conviction.287
These cases tell us that hope for greater privacy under the Stored
Communications Act is more likely to come from Congress than
from the courts.
3.3.5. The FISA Cases
In United States v. Duggan, the appellants argued inter alia that
FISA violates the probable-cause clause of the Fourth Amendment,
that FISA was used to conduct a criminal investigation, and that
doing so is an impermissible construction of the authority conferred
by the statute.288 According to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit:
[T]he President had the inherent power to conduct
warrantless electronic surveillance . . . and that such
surveillances constituted an exception to the warrant

Id. at 285.
Id. at 288.
287 Since 2010, other federal courts have applied Warshak’s standard. See, e.g.,
Kerr, supra note 109, at 401–02 (citing United States v. Ali, 870 F. Supp. 2d 10, 39
(D.D.C 2012) (noting the difficulty in applying Fourth Amendment protection to
complex sets of emails that may include nonmaterial information); State v. Hinton,
280 P.3d 476, 483 (Wash.App. Div. 2 2012) (noting the court’s finding that an email
subscriber has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of emails); In re
Applications for Search Warrants for Information Associated with Target Email Accounts/Skype Accounts, 2012 WL 4383917, at *5 (D.Kan. 2012) (noting a two-part
test to determine whether the expectation of privacy is reasonable)).
288 United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 73–74 (2d Cir. 1984).
285
286
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requirement. . . . Congress passed FISA to . . . ‘remove any
doubt as to the lawfulness of such surveillance.’”289
In response to the impermissible-construction argument, the court
turned to the legislative history of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, specifically the Senate Report, noting that
“intelligence and criminal law enforcement tend to merge in [the
area of foreign counterintelligence investigations]” and that
“[s]urveillances conducted under [FISA] need not stop once
conclusive evidence of a crime is obtained, but instead may be
extended longer where protective measures other than arrest and
prosecution are more appropriate.”290
In United States v. Damrah, Damrah argued that the FISA
surveillance review procedures violated his constitutional rights.291
In particular, Damrah argued that the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution required an evidentiary hearing and that the ex parte
review provided by the district court was unconstitutional. 292 The
court held that the FISA procedures were consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.293
In In re Sealed Case,294 the United States Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court of Review (“The Court of Review”) reviewed a
decision by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that
partially denied an application to authorize electronic surveillance
where “a significant purpose” of the surveillance was to gather
intelligence information.295 The Court of Review held that the FISC
ignored the effects of the USA Patriot Act on coordination between
law enforcement and intelligence made possible by the change in
statutory language from “the purpose” to “a significant purpose.”296
Id. at 72–73.
See id. (“FISA reflects both Congress’s ‘legislative judgment’ that the court
orders and other procedural safeguards laid out in the Act ‘are necessary to ensure
that electronic surveillance by the U.S. Government within this country conforms
to the fundamental principles of the fourth amendment.’”) (quoting 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News 3979–80).
291 United States. v. Damrah, 412 F.3d 618, 623–624 (6th Cir. 2005).
292 Id. at 623.
293 Id. at 625.
294 In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717, 735 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). See also
Michael P. O’Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the
Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1234, 1237–39 (2002–03) (discussing the
importance of this case).
295 In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d at 735.
296 Id.
289
290
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In United States v. Abu-Jihaad, Abu-Jihaad, a sailor with the U.S.
Navy, was convicted of communicating national defense
information concerning the movements of a United States Navy
battle group to unauthorized persons.297 He appealed his conviction
on the grounds that FISA is unconstitutional on its face as a violation
of the Fourth Amendment and that the statute’s requirements were
not met in the case.298 Abu-Jihaad argued that the primary-purpose
requirement is essential to the constitutionality of FISA.299 Absent
such a restriction, the government may misuse the statute to procure
warrants for criminal investigations without demonstrating the
probable cause essential to that latter purpose.300 An important case
relied upon by the Court in Abu-Jihaad is the U.S. Supreme Court
case United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan.301 This case is typically referred to as the Keith case, in
reference to the last name of the federal district judge in the case.302
In Keith, the Court determined that a judicial warrant is required
to be issued before the government may engage in wiretapping or
other forms of surveillance of threats involving national security.303
This holding was expressly restricted to “the domestic aspects of
national security[.]”304 Therefore, the Court’s reliance upon this case
in Abu-Jihaad is inappropriate. The rationale of Judge Keith was as
follows: “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be
guaranteed if domestic security surveillance may be conducted
solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.”305 The case
law pertaining to Fourth Amendment protections of papers and
effects demonstrates a trend towards limited protection and
increased latitude both for law enforcement and for intelligence
agencies. Warshak and Davis are rare exceptions that grant a
reasonable expectation of privacy over stored e-mails and cell site
location data, respectively. Quon is cited not for the presumption of
a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages, but instead for
United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 531 F.Supp.2d 299, 300 (D. Conn. 2008).
Id. at 301–02.
299 Id. at 304.
300 Id. at 313.
301 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court E. D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
302 Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States District Court
(Keith): The Surveillance Power, 189 COLUMBIA L. S. PUB. L. & LEG. THEORY WORKING
GROUP 8, 8 (2008).
303 Id.
304 United States. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 321–22.
305 Id. at 316–17.
297
298
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dicta that cautions against the judiciary elaborating on Fourth
Amendment protections regarding emerging technology.
This part has described the current state of U.S. law as it relates
to Internet surveillance. A general observation from all of this is the
extreme fragmentation of U.S. law in this area. When comparing
these laws with the international obligations discussed in Part 2
above, it is not entirely clear that the relaxation of surveillance
standards in these various laws are proportional to the threats to
national security. At some point, targets should be able to demand
their due process rights before a judicial body, and the Kafka-esque
world that results from a lack of such due process procedures makes
it hard to assess proportionality, let alone agree that these measures
are proportional. Of course, knowledge of the exact threats is
needed in order to determine proportionality, and it is difficult to
get this information without the assistance of intelligence agencies,
who likely are unwilling to share such details. Likewise, it is
difficult to assess whether these measures are necessary to meet the
demands of reality, although it is difficult to envision any scenario
that makes it acceptable to deny individuals their due process rights
with regard to Internet surveillance. Therefore, it is not entirely
clear whether the U.S. laws mentioned in this part violate the
international obligations mentioned in the previous part. Assessing
the quality of the laws associated with Internet surveillance becomes
somewhat easier when comparing the laws of two jurisdictions, as
opposed to the international standards found in international
human rights law. The next part provides an analysis of the PRC’s
law on Internet surveillance.
4. PRC LAW ON INTERNET SURVEILLANCE
The right to privacy, which commentators call a basic human
right that “transcends geographical, cultural and racial
boundaries,”306 also has been important in China all the way back to

306 Alexandra Rengel, Privacy-Invading Technologies and Recommendations for
Designing a Better Future for Privacy Rights, 8 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 177,
177 (2013). See also Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (examining
the foundations of the right to privacy and how invasions of privacy make men
feel). See generally JAMES MICHAEL, PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL
AND COMPARATIVE STUDY, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO DEVELOPMENTS IN
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 1–2 (1994).
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ancient times.307 Turning to today, Article 35 of the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China protects citizens’ freedom of speech,
among other rights.308 Nevertheless, the People’s Republic of China
has “one of the most pervasive and sophisticated regimes of Internet
filtering and information control” in the world,309 which involves
the monitoring and the recording of the movements of an individual
or group of individuals by new Internet technology.310 Although the
Internet started out as being seen as a public forum that could not
be controlled,311 and even was characterized as “God’s gift to
China,”312 that perception has changed to being just another one of
the “government's tool[s] to tamp down political threats.”313
Indeed, commentators portray China’s policies as running
roughshod over the people’s right to privacy.314 Internet use in
307 See Jingchun Cao, Protecting the Right to Privacy in China, 36 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 645, 646–47 (2005) (asserting that privacy was protected, to
some extent, in ancient China and an awareness of privacy may be found all the
way back to the Warring States Period). See generally Yao-Huai Lu. Privacy and Data
Privacy Issues in Contemporary China, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 7 (2005) (arguing that
privacy protections will continue to expand in modern China and that these emerging conceptions of privacy will remain distinctively Chinese with traditional Chinese values and approaches).
308 See CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA Mar. 14, 2004, art. 35
(protecting citizens’ “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of
procession and of demonstration”).
309 Country Profiles – China, OPENNET INITIATIVE. (Aug. 9, 2012), opennet.net/research/profiles/china-including-hong-kong. See also Lijun Tang & Peidong Yang, Symbolic Power and the Internet: The Power of a “Horse,” 33 MEDIA,
CULTURE & SOC’Y 675, 678–79 (2011) (commenting on the control and freedom of
internet use in China). See generally Surya Deva, Corporate Complicity in Internet Censorship in China: Who Cares for the Global Compact of the Global Online Freedom Act?,
39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 255, 262 (2007).
310 See Pursuant to section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000
COVERT SURVEILLANCE AND PROPERTY INTERFERENCE: REVISED CODE OF PRACTICE 7
(2010) (discussing the basis of lawful surveillance activity).
311 See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 75–77 (2007).
312 Andrew Jacobs & Jonathan Ansfield, Nobel Peace Prize Given to Jailed Chinese
Dissident, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2010, at A1, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/10/
09/world/09nobel.html?pagewanted=all.
313 Lee & Liu, supra note 4, at 126 (“In an environment where information flows
pervasively, the most effective and efficient tool for government control is probably
neither strict law nor military force, but technology itself.”). See also Kristen Farrell,
The Big Mamas are Watching: China's Censorship of the Internet and the Strain on Freedom of Expression, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 577, 590 (2007) (arguing that the Internet
has increasingly become “a tool for security agencies to identify, monitor, arrest
and imprison potential dissidents.”).
314 See YUEZHI ZHAO, COMMUNICATION IN CHINA: POLITICAL ECONOMY, POWER,
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China has grown at a seemingly exponential rate.315 However, there
are only a few legal limitations on the authorities when it comes to
Internet surveillance, with the vast majority of laws providing the
authorities many express powers over content censorship.316 This
part analyzes PRC legislation, regulations adopted by the State
Council, and ministerial measures adopted in relation to Internet
surveillance, with particular attention being paid to any procedural
and substantive limitations on the government’s Internet
surveillance powers that these instruments might provide,
especially within the context of matters relating to national security
and public interests. Before proceeding with that analysis, however,
it is important to note how surprising it is that there are no relevant
cases in the PRC concerning electronic surveillance and censorship.
There are a few potential reasons for this. First, it may be that there
are a few cases, but they have not been reported or publicized as
they relate to state secrets or classified information, which is quite
common for PRC cases.317 Second, PRC courts will not officially
AND CONFLICT

31–32 (2008) (analyzing the transformation of China’s communication system).
315 See THE INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL PRC, PROGRESS IN
CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2013, May 2014, available at www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/
wz/Document/1371125/1371125.htm.
(“[T]he number of citizens in China had reached 618 million and the Internet coverage rate 45.8 percent; domain names totaled 18.44 million, websites 3.2 million and webpages 150 billion; Internet forum/bulletin board
system (BBS) users numbered 120 million, blog and personal webpage users 437 million, social networking website users 278 million, network literature users 274 million, network video users 428 million, microblog users 281 million and instant messaging (IM) users 532 million; cellphone IM
users numbered 431 million and cellphone microblog users 196 million;
and 5,820 websites in China providing Internet education information services, 703 providing Internet news information services, 783 providing Internet cultural products, 282 providing Internet audio-visual programs,
292 providing Internet publishing services and 2,010 providing Internet
BBS services.”).
See RONALD DEIBERT, ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS
RULE IN CYBERSPACE 456–60 (2010) (noting that more than sixty government
regulations, enforced at both the national and local levels, regulate online content).
See also Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in the People's Republic of
China, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2007) (recognizing how the Chinese
Communist Party has regulated the internet extensively).
317 For cases not tried in open court sessions because of their involvement of
state secrets, see CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art.
183 (1996) (“A people’s court shall try cases of first instance in open court sessions,
except for the cases involving state secrets or personal privacy.”). See also CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 134 (1991) (stating that
cases that involve state secrets shall not be heard publicly by people’s courts). See
316

AND
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accept and register those cases so that the potential risks and
responsibilities associated with taking on such cases will be
minimized.318 Finally, where such issues arise, administrative
agencies might prefer handling the matter through administrative
measures, as opposed to the courts.319 With that in mind, this part
proceeds to analyze the PRC law on electronic surveillance.
4.1. Summary of PRC Legislation
From the outset, it is important to understand that the
Communist Part of China (“CPC”) has adopted no special law that
restricts the government’s power to conduct Internet surveillance
per se. There are several models for protecting privacy generally in
the literature, including a comprehensive law, specific sectorial
laws, and laws that promote self-regulation.320 In many states, these
models are used together to ensure privacy protection, especially
from the potential abuse from the exemptions for law enforcement
and intelligence agencies. The comprehensive law model is favored
by Europe, with E.U. laws that govern the collection, use, and
dissemination of personal information by both public and private
generally ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art.
65 (1989).
318 See Kevin J. O'Brien & Lianjiang Li, Suing the Local State: Administrative Litigation in Rural China, THE CHINA JOURNAL, Jan. 2004, at 75, 80–83 (“According to a
Chinese researcher: ‘courts can only manoeuvre around a handful of so-called “concrete administrative acts”, and dare not undertake big moves on the numerous general actions based on 'policies' (zhengce). Taking into account the large number of
illegal actions, lawsuits filed and accepted amount to one cup of water when a
whole cart of hay is on fire.”); Xin He, Why Did They not Take on the Disputes? Law,
Power and Politics in the Decision-Making of Chinese Courts, 3 INT’L J. L. IN CONTEXT
203, 221–22 (2007) (recognizing how courts are not directly taking on certain disputes).
319 See O'Brien & Li, supra note 318, at 80-83 (“Sometimes, acceptance of a suit
induces the defendants to pursue a settlement out of court.”); Veron Mei-Ying
Hung, Administrative Litigation and Court Reform in the People's Republic of
China, (November, 2002) (Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford Law School) at 260–65 (discussing how cases are resolved through disguised forms of mediation (e.g., xietiao));
Robyn Marshall, Administrative Law in the People's Republic of China: A Process
of Justice (2003) (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University) at 211 (preferring the term "pre-end-of-trial settlement" because judges are often intimately involved in the process).
320 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER AND PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL
(ORGANIZATION), PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1999: AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF
PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS 12–14 (1999) (recognizing and analyzing the major models for privacy protections).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

480

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:2

entities.321 There is no general data protection law in the PRC, and
there are only a few laws that limit government interference with
privacy. This should not come as a surprise, as it seems like
common knowledge that the PRC has a long-standing policy of
keeping close track of its citizens.322 Even though the PRC
Constitution states that the law shall protect citizens’ privacy with
regard to correspondence,323 no special law or enforceable legal
rules implementing this constitutional right exist. Moreover, those
provisions that relate to the protection of personal information in the
context of criminal law, tort law, and elsewhere lack detail and are
of questionable enforceability.324 More important for this article,
these laws do not expressly (or even implicitly) restrict the
government’s powers with Internet surveillance, let alone when
national security and public interests are involved. The Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences created the draft bill Personal
Information Protection Law to the State Council for consideration in
2008, although there has been no further action taken on this draft
bill, allegedly due to conflicting opinions of different ministries and
administrative authorities.325 Moreover, there are some pieces of
legislation that restrict the government’s Internet surveillance
powers in name only, such as the Telecommunications Regulations
of the People's Republic of China (2000) and the Information
Security Technology—Guidelines on Personal Information
Protection of Public and Commercial Service Information Systems
(2012), as explained in the following sections of this part of the
321 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 24 Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, No. L. 281/31-50,
23/11/1995 (protecting the rights and freedoms of natural persons, and particularly
“their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”).
322 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 320, at 58 (discussing the level of protection to unauthorized access of private information).
323 CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, arts. 38 and 40.
324 See, e.g., GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA, art. 120 (1986) (“Where the right of a citizen to his name, likeness, reputation, or honor is infringed, he has a right to demand that the infringement cease,
the reputation be restored, and the effects [of the infringement] be eliminated, and
to demand an apology; he may also demand compensation for loss.”); CRIMINAL
LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, art. 253 (1979, revised 1997) (“Postal workers who open, hide, or destroy mail or telegrams without authorization are to be
sentenced to two years or less in prison or put under criminal detention.”).
325 See Li Li & Wenmiao Xu. Why the Personal Information Protection Legislation
is “Shut Down”?, CHINA YOUTH DAILY, May 23, 2012, at 3, available at zqb.cyol.com/
html/2012-05/23/nw.D110000zgqnb_20120523_2-03.htm (reporting on the Chinese legislative process regardng personal information protection).
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article. However, no comprehensive law or abstract or specific legal
principles in legislation are seen as actually restricting the
government’s Internet surveillance powers. In addition, no judicial
review or remedial mechanism exists to address state Internet
surveillance. Indeed, cases involving these kinds of issues likely will
not even be heard by the judiciary, given the political sensitivity
involved, and so it is difficult to anticipate the types of remedies that
might conceivably be available if the situation were different.326 To
be clear, the PRC appears to be expanding its efforts to censor and
control the Internet through surveillance, both with regard to new
technology and to new online mediums of expression.327 In essence,
the PRC can be seen as using technological innovation to detect
As one
malfeasance,328 as well as to control information.
commentator has stated, “Code is the law,”329 with the PRC
controlling the Internet through code.330 While this might be
troubling from a privacy perspective, the People’s Republic of China
appears to have never given anyone a basis to believe that they have
a reasonable expectation of privacy within the People’s Republic of
China. Therefore, the relative predictability of the PRC’s approach
makes it somewhat favorable to the U.S. approach, where U.S.
citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy on account of the
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but that protection has
been severely undermined mainly in the name of U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts. The remainder of this part analyzes the relevant PRC laws,
regulations and guidelines that relate to Internet surveillance, with
an eye to trying to find actual limitations on PRC Internet
surveillance.

326 See R. P. PEERENBOOM, CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 280–82,
298–316 (2002) (discussing judicial independence in China).
327 See Provisional Regulations for the Administration of Online Culture, May
10, 2003, Article 3(2) (regulating “the distribution of cultural products, not just over
the Internet, but also to such ‘user terminals’ as ‘fixed-line telephones, mobile telephones, radios, television sets, and games machines for browsing, reading, appreciation, use or downloading by internet users . . . .’”).
328 See generally Jonathan Sullivan, China’s Weibo: Is Faster Different?, 16 NEW
MEDIA & SOC’Y 24 (2014).
329 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5, 24 (2006 2ND
eds.).
330 See Lee & Liu, supra note 4, at 129 (“What we attempt to illustrate is how a
government can shape human behavior via architecture design and the inimitable
role played by code-based regulations in law enforcement.”).
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4.2. Law Enacted by the National People's Congress

4.2.1. Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State
Secrets (2010)
On April 29, 2010, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on
Guarding State Secrets was adopted at the 14th Session of the 11th
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the
People's Republic of China, which law came into effect on October
1, 2010.331 Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of that law provides, “State
secrets shall be prohibited from being transmitted on the Internet or
any other public information network or via wire or wireless
communications without any security measures.”332 Article 27
further provides that “the editing, publication, printing and
distribution of newspapers, books, audio and video products and
electronic publications, the production and broadcasting of
broadcasts, television programs and films, the information
compilation and release on the Internet, mobile communications
networks and other public information networks and via other
media must comply with the secret-guiding provisions.”333 In
accordance with Article 28, Internet operators, network operators
and service providers are obliged to: (1) cooperate with government
authorities when carrying out investigation; (2) stop the
transmission of problematic cases, keeping the records and making
a report of such cases; and (3) delete information when required in
order to guard state secrets.334
An important question that arises from these provisions is what
is the precise definition and scope of “state secret.” Article 2 defines
“state secret” as “matters that have a vital bearing on state security
and national interests and, as determined according to statutory
procedures, are known by people within a certain scope for a given
331 See U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 2010 REPORT
TO CONGRESS OF THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, at 258

(2010) (discussing the revisions of China’s State Secret Laws).
332 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Law of the People's
Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, Order No. 28 of the President of the
People's Republic of China, Apr. 29, 2010, at art. 26 (entered into force Oct. 1, 2010)
(translation from Westlaw China).
333 Id. at art. 27
334 Id. at art. 28.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1

2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 483
period of time.”335 Article 9 specifically contains six categories of
secrets and two other ambiguous kinds of information (other
matters and secrets of political parties) all falling under the scope of
state secrets:
The following matters involving State security and national
interests shall be determined as State secrets if the
divulgence of such matters is likely to prejudice State
security and national interests in the fields such as political
affairs, economy, national defense and foreign affairs:
(1) secrets concerning major policy decisions on State affairs;
(2) secrets in the building of national defense and in the
activities of the armed forces;
(3) secrets in diplomatic activities and in the activities related
to foreign affairs as well as secrets to be kept as commitments
to foreign countries;
(4) secrets in the national economic and social development;
(5) secrets concerning science and technology;
(6) secrets concerning the activities for safeguarding State
security and the investigation of criminal offences; and
(7) other matters that are classified as State secrets by the
State secret-guarding department.
Secrets of political parties that conform to the provisions of
the preceding paragraph shall be State secrets.336

335 Id., at art. 9. See also Phillip Barber, Bull in the China Market: The Gap between
Investor Expectations and Auditor Liability for Chinese Financial Statement Frauds, 24
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 355 (2013) (“China’s ‘state secrets’ laws may cover
audit work papers and may require pre-approval from Chinese regulatory authorities before any disclosure to foreign regulators.”); Qingxiu Bu, The Chinese Reverse
Merger Companies (RMCs) Reassessed: Promising but Challenging?, 12 J. INT’L BUS. & L.
17, 27 (2013) (“Another most controversial issue is whether a PCAOB-registered but
China-based audit firm is obliged to file an SEC report. The defendant argued that
Chinese State Secrets Law criminalizes the disclosure of information that relates to
Chinese national security and other potentially sensitive interests.”). But see SEC v.
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu CPA, 928 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D. Del 2013) (declaration of
Donald Clarke indicating that, for off-site inspections, Chinese law does not require
pre-approval and that an auditor could make a judgment for itself that its work
papers contain no state secrets).
336 Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, supra note 332, at
art. 9.
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Article 28 of this law also provides the obligations on Internet
operators and other public information network operators and
service providers:
Internet operators and other public information network
operators and service providers shall provide cooperation in
the investigation over cases involving the divulgence of State
secrets conducted by the public security organs, State
security organs and procuratorial organs; when discovering
that the information released on the Internet or any other
public information network involves divulgence of State
secrets, the operators and providers shall immediately stop
the transmission thereof, keep the relevant records, and
make a report to the public security organs, the State security
organs or the secret-guarding administrative departments;
the information involving the divulgence of State secrets
shall be deleted as required by the public security organs, the
State security organs or the secret-guarding administrative
departments.337
Therefore, as long as related security organs and administrative
departments claim that the online information fits within one of
these categories of “state secrets,” then those Internet operators,
network operators and service providers have the obligation to
delete the content, with political pressure and economic threats
further ensuring compliance.338 As can be seen from a few incidents
in Shanghai, the government authorities seem to have complete
discretion in classifying actions into these categories, with no
possibility of meaningful judicial review being observed.339 Such a
Id. at art. 28.
Id. at arts. 48–49. See also State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
Implementing Regulations of the Law of the People's Republic of China on Guarding State Secrets, art. 40
337
338

(“Where, during confidentiality inspection or the investigation of a case of
divulgement of State secrets, the relevant organ or entity and its staff
members refuse to provide cooperation, practice fraud, conceal or destroy
evidence, or otherwise avoid or obstruct such inspection or investigation,
the person directly in charge and other personnel subject to direct liabilities shall be given disciplinary sanctions pursuant to the law. Any enterprise or public institution and its staff members that assist an organ or entity to avoid or obstruct confidentiality inspection or the investigation of a
case of divulgement of State secrets shall be punished by relevant competent departments pursuant to the law.”).
339 See Yu v. Shanghai Municipal People's Government, Shanghai Second Intermediate Court, Initial Administrative Ruling, Docket No. 52, Jan. 14, 2011

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1

2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 485
broad classification of state secrets allows the government agencies
to have stronger decision-making powers when it comes to Internet
censorship.340 In the place of clear standards has arisen a host of
“sensitive words” (or Min Gan Ci), which are not to be used in online
searches in the PRC.341
Clearly, there is considerable interference in people’s freedom of
expression from this method of controlling large ISPs and other
kinds of data owners.342 In order to perform their duties of
reporting, deleting and providing information to security
authorities, large-scale and instant information censorship and
Internet surveillance are required of ISPs and other Internet
operators, under the general guidance and direct requirements of
national security public authorities.343 The end of this section
compares these actions with U.S. Internet surveillance and
international norms. However, before providing that analysis, a few
other PRC laws must be analyzed.

(“monthly income data about the proceeds from the car license plate (private car
quota) auction” and “certificate and related records of ownership of real estate” are
classified as “state secrets,” and the court did not try to challenge or review the
executive branch’s discretion).
340 See Michael Ting, The Role of the WTO in Limiting China's Censorship Policies,
41 HONG KONG L.J. 285, 288 (2011) (discussing censorship in China). See also Anne
S.Y. Cheung, The Business of Governance: China's Legislation on Content Regulation in
Cyberspace, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1, 15 (2005) (“The scope of the Encryption
Regulations is so broad and the requirements so stringent that they even cover Lotus
and Microsoft office suites.”).
341 Rebecca MacKinnon, China’s Censorship 2.0: How Companies Censor Bloggers,
FIRST MONDAY, Feb. 2009, available at http://firstmonday.org/article/view/2378/
2089. See also THOMAS LUM, INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND INFORMATION CONTROL IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 4 (2006) (analyzing methods of PRC Internet censorship and content control).
342 See Christopher Stevenson, Breaching the Great Firewall: China's Internet Censorship and the Quest for Freedom of Expression in a Connected World, 30 BC INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 531, 538 (2007) (discussing Chinese internet regulations on providers
of Internet services). See also Trina K. Kissel, License to Blog: Internet Regulation in the
People's Republic of China, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 229, 236 (2007) (discussing
regulations developed by CPP that hold “many entities and individuals accountable for accessible content on the Internet”).
343 See Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, supra note 332,
art. 28; Cheung, supra note 340, at 37 (“The waves of legislation that have been
passed in China to monitor the Internet have caused a ripple effect in legal, Internet,
and business culture, and concrete legal regulations on the suppression of speech
are going hand in hand with an emerging set of social business norms.”)
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4.2.2. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress
The Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress on Strengthening Network Information Protection was
adopted and came into effect at the 30th Session of the Standing
Committee of the 11th National People's Congress on December 28,
2012.344 The decision itself is quite broad and better represents a set
of principles than a clear law, with many of the provisions lacking
the specificity required for accurate understanding and
compliance.345 In essence, the decision sets out some rules for
Internet service providers and other entities to follow in relation to
electronic personal information. In particular, the decision provides
that electronic personal data and electronic privacy shall be
protected, and organizations as well as individuals are prohibited
from stealing or otherwise unlawfully obtaining personal electronic
information.346 Network service providers shall take technical
measures and other necessary measures, particularly including
remedial measures, to ensure information security.347 A noticeable
gap in the decision is a restriction on governmental powers
concerning Internet surveillance in the name of national security
and public interests.
It is interesting to note that this decision was adopted with the
goal of “safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of citizens,
legal persons and other organizations, as well as national security
344 See Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Decision of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Strengthening Network
Information Protection, Adopted at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of
the 11th National People's Congress on Dec. 28, 2012.
345 For example, there is no guidance regarding which governmental department or agency will supervise or enforce the rules. See Erica Gann Kitaev, China
Adopts Privacy Legislation Strengthening Online Personal Data Protection, DATA
PRIVACY MONITOR, Jan. 8, 2013, (“The decision reflects China’s recent push to address the issue of online personal data protection . . . .”).
346 See NATIONAL PEOPLE’S CONGRESS STANDING COMMITTEE, DECISION OF THE
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON STRENGTHENING
NETWORK INFORMATION PROTECTION ¶ 1 (“The State shall protect electronic information that is able to identify the identity of individual citizens and electronic information concerning the personal privacy of citizens. Organizations and individuals shall neither steal or otherwise unlawfully obtain the personal electronic
information of citizens, nor sell or illegally provide others with such electronic information.”).
347 Id. at ¶ 4.
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and public interest.”348 This language notwithstanding, the decision
focuses on what network service providers should do to fulfill their
obligations, with no portion providing a restriction on
governmental agencies’ powers in investigation, censorship,
wiretapping and spying in the name of national security and public
interests.349
Without adequate oversight and independent
supervision, the mere presence of an exception for national security
and public interests would appear to have a significant chilling
effect on expression.350
4.3. Regulations Enacted by the State Council

4.3.1. Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services
(2000)
“Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services”
was adopted by the PRC State Council on September 25, 2000,351 and
deals with how the government can control the operation of profitmaking Internet information services, from the initial executive
permission to legal obligations and to punishments.352 These
measures include a permit system for profit-making Internet
information services and the record-filing system of non-profitmaking Internet information services,353 which enables the
government to tightly control the ISPs and other Internet
Id. at preface.
Id. at ¶¶ 2–6.
350 See ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, supra note 320, at 14–15 (analyzing the models of privacy protection); Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance.
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013) (asserting this constitutes a major erosion of
personal privacy).
351 Hulian Wang, Xinxi Fuwu & Guanli Banfa (互联网信息服务管理办法) [Administrative Measures on Internet Information Services] (promulgated by the St.
Council, Sep. 25, 2000, effective Jan. 8, 2001), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2011/content_1860864.htm.
352 See, e.g., id., arts. 19–25 (providing legal penalties and other punishments
for violations).
353 See Wang et al., supra note 351, art. 4 (2000) (“The State applies the permit
system to profit-making Internet information services and applies the record-filing
system to non-profit-making Internet information services. Anyone who does not
obtain a license or does not go through the record-filing formalities shall not engage
in Internet information services.”).
348
349
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operators.354 These measures also include more strict supervision of
“electronic bulletin board services,” referring to “item-specific
application” and “item-specific record-filing.”355 In particular,
Article 14 of these measures states:
An Internet information service provider engaged in news,
publication, or electronic bulletin board services shall keep
records of the information provided, time of publishing, and
the Internet address or domain name.
An Internet
connection service provider shall keep records of the online
users' connection time, accounts, Internet address or domain
name, and the calling party's telephone number.
The backup records of the Internet information service
provider and the Internet access service provider shall be
kept for 60 days, and shall be provided to the relevant
authorities for inquiry purposes if so required.356
Article 16 of these measures also creates for Internet information
providers the obligation to “promptly terminate the distribution
and keep relevant records and report to the relevant authorities,”357
which is similar to other provisions in laws and regulations already
mentioned above. Controlling the flow of information on the
Internet always has been an indispensable part of the PRC
government’s efforts to maintaining social stability and national
security.358
354 See id. at art. 5 (“Any engagement in Internet information services related
to news, publication, education, medical and health care, pharmaceuticals and
medical equipment etc., prior to applying for an operation permit or going through
the record-filing formalities, shall be subject to the examination and consent of the
relevant competent authorities.”).
355 See id. at art. 9. (“When applying for an operation permit for its profit-making Internet information services or filing for record of its non-profit-making Internet information service, an Internet service provider who intends to provide electronic bulletin board services shall, in accordance with the relevant provisions of
the State, submit an item-specific application or apply for item-specific record-filing.”).
356 Id. at art. 14.
357 Id. at art. 16 (“Where an Internet information provider discovers the information distributed on its website apparently falls within the scope as provided in
Article 15 of these Measures, it shall promptly terminate the distribution and keep
relevant records and report to the relevant authorities.”).
358 See Wei Shen, Will the Door Open Wider in the Aftermath of Alibaba-Placing (or
Misplacing) Foreign Investment in a Chinese Public Law Frame, 42 HONG KONG L.J. 561,
585 (2012) (examining China's regulatory measures in tackling the "variable interest
entity" structure widely adopted by foreign entities seeking to access China's telecommunications market, and offering a political economy analysis to potentially
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4.3.2. Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of
China (2000)
The PRC State Council also created the Telecommunications
Regulations in 2000, which apply to basic telecom services and
value-added telecom services, including most aspects of Internet
service.359 Article 66(1) of those regulations would appear to refer to
some restrictions on government authorities in using telecom
communications:
Telecom users' freedom to legally use telecom and the
confidentiality of their communications are protected by
law. No organization or individual may inspect the content
of telecom for any reason, except that public security
authorities, the State security authority, and the People's
Procuratorate may do so in accordance with the procedures
stipulated by law in response to the requirements of State
security or the investigation of criminal offences.360
An exhaustive search for such “procedures stipulated by law” has
uncovered no such procedures. Without such procedures, this
supposed limitation on government authority under Article 66(1)
turns out to be entirely empty.
rationalize these regulatory movements.). See also Cheung, supra note 340, at 19
(“The general rule is that all IISPs are required to provide online users with quality
services and to ensure the ‘legality’ of the information that is provided under article
13. Under article 14, IISPs that offer news coverage and bulletin board services are
required to keep a sixty-day record of the information that they distribute, when it
is distributed, and the Web address where the information is located. IISPs are
similarly required to keep records of the time of use, accounts of Internet addresses
or domain names, and dial-in telephone numbers of online users for 60 days. The
Regulations are considered to be the prime model for the strict control of Internet
administration.”).
359 See Dianxin Tiaoli (电信条例) [Telecommunications Regulation] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sep. 25, 2000, revised July 29, 2014, effective July 29, 2014),
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11294912/n11296257/16519133.html, art.
2(2) (2000) (“For the purposes of these Regulations, telecom shall mean the activities
of delivery, transmission, or reception of voice, text, data, image, and other forms
of information through utilizing wire or wireless electromagnetic system or photoelectric system.”).
360 Jisuanji Xinxi, Wangluo Guoji, Lianwang Guanli & Zanxing Guiding (计算
机信息网络国际联网管理暂行规定) [Interim Provisions Governing International Interconnection of Computer-based Information Networks] (promulgated by the St.
Council, Feb. 1, 2006, revised May 20, 1997, effective May 20, 1997),
http://govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/fjsfz/zfgb/19978160/201104/t20110413_680140.shtml?
classid=388.
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Other regulations from the State Council would appear to be
relevant to this study, based on their name. For example, there is
the 1997 “Interim Provisions of the People's Republic of China
Governing International Interconnection of Computer-based
Information Networks.”361 However, these interim provisions do
not refer to precise procedures or criteria for Internet surveillance
and state governance, and so have not been featured in this article.
4.4. Departmental Measures

4.4.1. Administrative Measures for Protection of the Security of
International Inter-Networking of Computer Information
Networks (1997)
The Administrative Measures for Protection of the Security of
International Inter-Networking of Computer Information Networks
was formulated by Ministry of Public Security and came into force
on December 30, 1997.362 These administrative measures related to
protection of computer-based information networks within the
PRC.363 In particular, these measures state that no unit or individual
may access computer-based networks or use computer-based
network resources without authorization, which authorization can
be granted by the Ministry of Public Security.364 Moreover, Article
5 ambiguously provides that it is prohibited to produce, reproduce,
search for or disseminate nine categories of information, including
“information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads rumours and
disrupts the social order” and “information that damages the
reputation and credibility of State organs.”365 The following is
Article 5 in full:
361 Jisuanji Xinxi et al. (计算机信息网络国际联网安全保护管理办法) [Administrative Measures for Protection of the Security of International Internetworking of
Computer Information Networks] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 11, 1997,
effective
Dec.
30,
1997),
http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3493/n3823/n442104/452202.html.
362 Ministry of Public Security of the People’s Republic of China, Administrative Measures for Protection of the Security of International Internetworking of
Computer Information Networks, Order No. 33, Dec. 16, 1997.
363 Id. at art. 2.
364 Id. at arts. 3, 6.
365 Id. at art. 5.
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No unit or individual may utilize international
interconnection to produce, reproduce, search for or
disseminate the following information:
(1) information that incites resistance to and disruption of the
implementation of the Constitution, laws and administrative
regulations;
(2) information that incites the subversion of the State
political power and the overthrow of the socialist system;
(3) information that incites the splitting up of the country
and the sabotage of national unity;
(4) information that incites hatred and discrimination among
ethnic groups and sabotages solidarity among ethnic groups;
(5) information that fabricates or distorts facts, spreads
rumours and disrupts the social order;
(6) information that propagates feudalistic superstitions,
obscenity, pornography, gambling, violence, murder and
terror and instigates crimes;
(7) information that openly insults others or fabricates facts
to slander others;
(8) information that damages the reputation and credibility
of State organs; and
(9) other information that violates the Constitution, laws and
administrative regulations.366
These measures are not very clear, and neither are the results, if any.
Moreover, under Article 8 and 10 of these measures, units and
individuals engaged in international interconnection businesses are
required to “accept security supervision, inspection and guidance of
public security organs, truthfully provide information, materials
and data” concerning security of “public security organs, and assist
public security organs in investigating and handling illegal and
criminal acts” through computer-based information networks.367
Id. at art. 5.
Hulian Wang, Wangluo Anquan, Xinxi Tongbao & Shishi Banfa (互联网网
络安全信息通报实施办法) [Ministry of Industry and Information for the Implementation of the Internet Security Information Report] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology, Apr. 13, 2009, effective June 1, 2009),
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11294057/n11302390/12336245
366
367
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Internet operators also must keep records, requiring users to “fill in
the user record form,” and requiring computer administration and
supervision agencies of public security organs to stay informed of
the records and information of the interconnecting units, keeping
files and statistics, and reporting them to the authorities in
accordance with the relevant State provisions.368
4.4.2. Measures for the Implementation of the Internet Security
Information Report (2009)
This security information reporting regulation was adopted by
the Ministry of Industry and Information, which came into effect on
June 1, 2009.369 The information that is required under these
measures is divided into event information (the information on the
network security events that already have occurred) and prewarning information (the information that poses a potential threat
or danger although no actual damage or impact has yet occurred, or
predictive information concluded after analysis into certain event
information).370
The content of event information to be provided to the
authorities includes the details of the event, any damages caused
and the extent of the impact.371 The content of pre-warning
information that must be provided to the authorities includes the
systems affected, the possible damage and degree of the damage if
the event occurs, the users that are likely to be affected, and the
recommended measures to be taken to avoid the actual event from
taking place.372 Based on the provision in Annex 1, state Internet
surveillance can be conducted with the collaboration of many
agencies (“information submission organizations”), including
communications administrative bureaus, basic telecom service
operators, value-added telecom service operators that operate
services in more than one province, the National Computer
.html.
Id. at arts. 11, 12, 16.
Ministry of Industry and Information of the People’s Republic of China,
Measures for the Implementation of the Internet Security Information Report. Gong
Xin Bu Bao [2009] No. 156, Apr. 13, 2009 (entered into force June 1, 2009).
370 Id.at art. 10.
371 Id.at art. 14.
372 Id.at art. 15.
368
369

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss2/1

2015] INTERNET SURVEILLANCE IN THE U.S. AND CHINA 493
Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination
Center of China (“CNCERT”), Internet domain name registration
administrative agency, Internet domain name registration service
agency, and the China Internet Association.373 In sum, the CNCERT,
entrusted with power by the Bureau of Communications Security
under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, is the
principal organization responsible for the information reporting
work, even though other information submission organizations
provide their respective information reports to the Bureau of
Communications Security for filing.374 Overlapping multi-level
administration is a long-term threat to further improvement of
Internet security information reporting.
4.4.3. Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of
Communication Networks (2010)
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology adopted
the Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of
Communication Networks on March 1, 2010.375 These measures are
to apply to the network security protection work with respect of
public communication networks and the Internet (“Communication
Networks”) managed and operated by telecommunication
operators and Internet domain name service providers (“Entities
Operating Communication Networks”) within China, with this
security protection work adhering to the principles of active
defense, comprehensive prevention, and hierarchical protection.376

373 Tongxin Wangluo, Anquan Fanghu & Guanli Banfa (通信网络安全防护管
理办法) [Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of Communication
Networks] (promulgated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology,
Jan. 21, Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/
n11294042/n11302345/13009694.html.
374 Id.at arts. 3–5, 7, 8.
375 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic
of China, Administrative Measures for the Security Protection of Communication
Networks, Decree No. 11, Jan. 21, 2010 (entered into force Mar. 1, 2010).
376 Dianxin He, Huluan Wang, Yonghu Geren & Xinxi Baohu Guiding (电信和
互联网用户个人信息保护规定) [Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information
of Telecommunications and Internet Users] (promulgated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, July 16, 2013, effective Sep. 1, 2013), art. 2,
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/15513450
.html.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

494

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:2

These measures specifically point out that the staff of the
Telecommunication Administrative Authority, which is made up of
the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and
Communication Administrative Bureaus, must have the obligation
to maintain the confidentiality of state secrets, trade secrets and
personal secrets that come to their knowledge in the course of
inspection.377 The question arises if these staff members are to
prohibit PRC intelligence agencies from accessing this information.
Again, no provisions restrict access to these types of agencies.
4.4.4. Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of
Telecommunications and Internet Users (2013)
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology adopted
Order No. 24 in 2013, which focused on “collecting and using the
personal information of users during the provision of
telecommunications services and Internet information services.”378
The key provisions, Articles 5 and 9, are as follows:
Article 5
Telecommunications business operators and Internet
information service providers shall, during the provision of
services, collect and use the personal information of users in
a lawful and proper manner and by following the principle
of necessity. . . .379
Article 9
Without the consent of users, telecommunications business
operators and Internet information service providers are not

Id., at art. 21.
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic
of China, Provisions on Protecting the Personal Information of Telecommunications
and Internet Users, Order No. 24 (2013), art. 2.
379 (信息安全技术公共及商用服务信息系统个人信息保护指南)
[Information
Security Technology – Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and
Commercial Service Information Systems], GB/Z 28828-2012, National Standard
Announcement No.28, (promulgated by the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine & Standardization Administration, Nov. 5,
2012, effective Feb. 1, 2013), http://china.ﬁndlaw.cn/jingjifa/wangluofalv/
wlysq/20131014/1067798.html.
377
378
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allowed to collect and use the personal information of the
users.
Telecommunications business operators and Internet
information service providers that collect or use the personal
information of users shall clearly inform the users of the
following information: the purposes, methods and scope of
information collection or use, the channels for the users to
inquire about and correct information, the consequences of
refusing to provide information, etc.
Telecommunications business operators and Internet
information service providers shall not collect users'
personal information that is not necessary for their provision
of services, shall not use users' personal information for
purposes other than the provision of services, and shall not
collect or use information in a deceptive, misleading or
compulsory manner, in violation of laws or administrative
regulations, or in breach of the agreements between relevant
parties.
After users have terminated the use of telecommunications
services or Internet information service, telecommunications
business operators and Internet information service
providers shall stop the collection and use of the users'
personal information, and provide the users with services for
deregistering relevant phone numbers or account numbers.
The provisions otherwise prescribed by laws or
administrative regulations on the circumstances listed under
Paragraph 1 through to Paragraph 4 of this article shall
prevail.380
Although Articles 5 and 9 state some basic principles for collecting
and using personal information, yet again there are no restrictions
on Internet surveillance when it comes to national security.
4.5. Other Guidelines
There are several non-binding rules and guidelines that are
designed to regulate the use of information systems for personal
380

Id. at art. 9.
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information handling. One example is entitled “Information
Security Technology—Guidelines on Personal Information
Protection of Public and Commercial Service Information Systems
(GB/Z28828-2012).”381 The General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine, and Standardization
Administration of the People’s Republic of China formulated this
national standard.382 This technical guidance is for organizations
and institutions other than government organs and other agencies
performing public administration duties, such as service agencies in
the fields of telecommunications, financial and medical services.383
The key provisions are as follows:
Article 4.1.5. Third-party testing and evaluation agency
From the perspective of protecting public interests, a thirdparty testing and evaluation agency shall, according to the
authorization granted by personal information protection
management departments and industry associations, or
upon entrustment by administrators of personal
information, test and evaluate information systems in
accordance with relevant State laws, regulations and this
guiding technical document to obtain the situations of
personal information protection which shall be taken as the
bases by administrators of personal information for
assessing, supervising and guiding personal information
protection work.384
Article 4.2. Fundamental principles
When handling personal information via information
systems, an administrator of personal information is
recommended to abide by the following fundamental
principles:
a) The principle of clear purposes . . .385
381 General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
& Standardization Administration of the People's Republic of China, Information
Security Technology -- Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and
Commercial Service Information Systems, GB/Z 28828-2012, National Standard
Announcement No.28, Nov. 5, 2012 (entered into force Feb. 1, 2013).
382 Id.
383 Id.at art. 1.
384 Id. at art. 4.1.5.
385 See id.at art. 4.2(a)
(“The principle of clear purposes -- The administrator of personal information shall
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b) The principle of minimum information necessary for the
performance of tasks . . .386
c) The principle of public notification . . .387
d) The principle of personal consent . . .
e) The principle of quality assurance . . .
f) The principle of security guarantee . . .
g) The principle of good faith performance . . ., and
h) The principle of clear responsibilities . . . .388
These guidelines divide the process of personal information
handling within an information system into four major stages,
collection, processing, transfer and deletion, and accordingly
personal information protection must be carried out throughout
these for stages.389 In addition, these guidelines establish several
mechanisms to supervise the security of information systems for the
sake of protecting the public interest of privacy, such as the “Thirdparty testing and evaluation” rule provided in Article 4.1.5.390
Moreover, those eight principles in Article 4.2 are similar to OECD
Council Recommendation and EU Directive (Directive 95/46/EC),
such as the “Data Quality Principle”391 (compared to “The principle
of minimum information necessary for the performance of tasks”,
handle personal information for specific, clear and reasonable purposes. It shall not
expand the scope of information use, and shall not change the purposes of personal
information handling when the relevant subject of personal information has no
knowledge thereof.”).
386 See id.at art. 4.2(b) (“The principle of minimum information necessary for
the performance of tasks -- The administrator of personal information shall only
handle the minimum amount of information relevant to the handling purposes, and
shall delete the personal information involved within the shortest period of time
after the handling purposes are fulfilled.”).
387 See id. at art. 5.2.5 (“Personal information shall be directly collected from a
subject of personal information by the means and methods already notified thereto.
It is not allowed to adopt covert means or indirect methods to collect personal information.”).
388 Id. at art. 4.2
389 Id. at art. 5.1.
390 Id. at art. 4.1.5.
391 Annex to the Recommendation of the Council of Sept. 23, 1980, Guidelines
Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, art.
8 (“Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used,
and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and
kept up-to-date.”).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

498

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 37:2

which is the PRC national standard) and “Purpose Specification
Principle”392 (compared to “the principle of clear purposes” in the
PRC this national standard).
The guidelines are quite important because those ISPs and
Internet operators that are to follow these guidelines are the agents
of state Internet surveillance in the PRC.393 As a result, this national
standard represents an effort on the part of the PRC to restrict state
Internet surveillance of personal information. Admittedly, these
standards represent non-binding guidelines, although their
similarity to the standards contained in the OECD Council
Recommendation and EU Directives is to be commended.
As the introduction to this part emphasized, the PRC
legislation, regulations adopted by the State Council and ministerial
measures adopted in relation to Internet surveillance provide no
real procedural and substantive limitations on the government’s
Internet surveillance powers. While the notion of an unrestrained
government when it comes to Internet surveillance is repugnant to
liberal democracies, in a way it is more predictable than the practices
of the United States when it comes to Internet surveillance,
inasmuch as the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides U.S. citizens with the basis for holding a
reasonable expectation of privacy, whereas nothing in PRC law
would provide such a reasonable expectation to PRC citizens. The
management philosophy and governance method of the PRC
government, at least when it comes to Internet surveillance, still
involve strong top-down political pressure and bottom-up
392

Id. at art. 9

(“The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified
not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited
to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible
with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of
purpose.”);
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm
(last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
393 See Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1417, 1425-39 (2009) (analyzing the costs of additional ISP regulation against
the net benefit to users' privacy interests). See also Cheung, supra note 340, at 11
(“the Chinese government has successfully created a culture of self-censorship not
only among its citizens, but also by co-opting local and foreign investors. These
capitalists duly comply with the general wishes of the government, and also act on
its behalf as non-state actors.”).
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maintenance of social stability, under the broad backdrop of
centralized authoritarianism.394
5. CONCLUSION
There are many differences between the laws governing
Internet surveillance of the United States and the People’s Republic
of China. With regard to the United States, there are many legal
restrictions on the government in conducting Internet surveillance.
The main one is the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
The threefold limitation in the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and the judicial warrant
mechanism in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 are
other important examples. However, the exact regulations that
govern the NSA’s activities are unknown. What is known is that the
NSA and other intelligence agencies get their permission from a
secret court whose decisions are not available for review. While the
hope is that this court exercises caution in granting such permission,
the 99.97 percent rate of granting requests is not particularly
encouraging, although it is not determinative one way or the other.
With regard to the PRC, there ostensibly are only two
instruments that limit the government’s Internet surveillance
efforts: the 2000 Telecommunications Regulations and the 2013
Guidelines on Personal Information Protection of Public and
Commercial Service Information Systems. The former appears to be
empty inasmuch as no procedures have been “stipulated by law,”
as the regulations require an order for there to be an actual limit on
the government when it comes to surveillance. The latter is
contained in non-binding guidelines. The rest of the instruments are
unequivocal in allowing the government unfettered access to
personal information when conducting Internet surveillance.
With regard to similarities, the PRC government has been
using "delegated control" over ISPs to control the Internet, and the
U.S. government appears to have done the same to some extent,
which some commentators refer to as “a regime of regulation, co-

394 See Shen, supra note 358, at 561 (providing examples of companies’ complaints when doing business in China); See also Cheung, supra note 340, at 8 (discussing the nine government-approved internet agencies, all of which pass through
the Ministry of Information Industry’s servers in Beijing, Shanghai, or Guangzhou).
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regulation and self-regulation.”395 Moreover, both governments
appear to have overwhelming access to all information when
national security and public interests are involved. Whether this is
troubling or not depends on one’s views on the magnitude of the
threats to national security that are out there and how trustworthy
the government is seen when using such information. Of course, the
government has a legitimate interest in getting information to
protect national security, especially by forcing ISPs and other
Internet operators to provide it with electronic privacy information.
However, surely there must be some limits within which these
governments operate. Inasmuch as the limits are not clear in both
jurisdictions, that potentially is a main area for improvement in the
future.
In the short term, the question becomes which approach to
Internet surveillance is potentially more harmful to the citizens who
live under both regimes. Is it more attractive from a citizen’s
perspective to know that the government is watching, or is it more
attractive for a citizen to have faith in law and the rule of law that
the government is not watching but then it turns out that the
government is watching? With the former situation, citizens can
adjust their behavior in order to avoid government scrutiny. In the
later, citizens are lulled into a false sense of security concerning
personal privacy and data, which ultimately might expose them to
considerable consequences that were not anticipated. Which would
you prefer? The answer to this question likely depends on one’s
own preferences for predictability, with a strong preference
presumably leading to tolerance of extensive interference in Internet
life. Assuming U.S. citizens had a reasonable expectation of privacy
with their Internet use before the Snowden revelations, surely the
reasonableness of such expectations has been diminished, if not
entirely removed. Of course, a determination by the appellate
courts of the unconstitutionality of such searches and seizures
would restore such reasonableness of expecting privacy, although it
is unclear how the courts will decide. Assuming it no longer is
reasonable to expect privacy from the government where the
government even remotely suspects a threat to national security or
public interests, tolerance for open surveillance can become a
rational, even optimal, option.
The main problem for both societies is how to restrict the
government's ability to force ISPs and other Internet operators to
395

Cheung, supra note 340, at 21.
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share private electronic information with the government in the
name of national security and ordre public. The long-term solution
to over-intrusive Internet surveillance has got to be the
establishment of limits on states' powers to force ISPs to give them
private electronic information. On the international level, more
norms are needed. Instead of arguing for the creation of more limits
through a new multilateral treaty, this article would prefer to update
those provisions in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and
the ICCPR that deal with the right to privacy, as those instruments
were drafted decades ago, and so it was difficult, if not impossible,
for the drafters of those instruments to foresee the importance of
Internet privacy and the extensive abuse of state power from
Internet surveillance. Updates might include how to restrict a state's
power to get information from big data companies, such as
Facebook, Google, and Yahoo, even when seeking this information
in the name of national security or public interests. Updates might
also include a Prohibitive Provisions Mode, which, like the U.S.
Constitution, indicates what the government cannot do, not just
what rights citizens enjoy. Moreover, if the government is allowed
to do something in special cases, such as in the name of national
security and public interests, these instruments could help establish
the worldwide procedural requirements that should be complied
with. In addition, it might be helpful to identify the kind of
"Effective Remedy" (under Article 2 of ICCPR) that can and should
be set up in the treaty. Updates of the Universal Declaration on
Human Rights and the ICCPR might help these instruments be
implemented in an effective manner in modern times, although
admittedly amending these instruments will not be easy. In the end,
while the PRC approach to Internet surveillance might be more
predictable than the approach of the United States, both fall far short
of the mark established by international human rights law.
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